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This thesis examines -factors influencing a Navy physi-
cian's decision to stay or leave the service in FY85.
Data contained in the Navy Medical O-f-ficer File, END FYS5
were analyzed using the LOGIT nonlinear estimation tech-
nique. The sample was restricted to o-f-ficers who were
not obligated to remain in the service.
Several logistic regression models indicated that
a physician's specialty and source of entry were significant
in this career decision. Specifically, executive medicine
officers, surgeons, pediatricians, OTHER physician special-
ists, and internists were found less likely to leave than
hospi tal -based or general medical officers. Similarly,
physicians entering the Navy via the Armed Forces Health
Professions Scholarship Program were more likely to leave
than volunteers or medical officers who entered the Navy
through earlier commissioning programs. In addition,
physicians were less likely to leave the service if they
received an increase in military pay, were augmented into
the regular Navy, had received aviation medicine training,
were a foreign medical graduate, were older, were more
senior in grade, were aliens or naturalized citizens,
had longer 1 ength-of -ser vi ce, or were not eligible to
ret i re.
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Recent discussions within the Department of Defense
(DQD) indicate concern that military medicine "can give
full treatment to only 35 percent o-f the casualties they
expect in a -full—scale conventional war" CRef. ID. According
to William E. Mayer, Assistant Secretary o-f Defense -for
Health Affairs, military medicine "exists to be able to
... take CAre of the troops ... and I know at this moment
we a.re not able to do that .... We a.re now, by God, doing
something about it." This "something" to improve medical
readiness means "military hospitals will focus on the
care needed to sharpen combat skills." This involves
the added problem of adjusting "the mix of patients that
come into the military treatment facilities so that ... ade-
quate work (can be given) to at least a larger number
of surgeons than we have now ..." CRef. 2D. The care
within military medical facilities will "shift gradual-
ly toward surgery and other skills relevant to combat,
while other types of ca.re such as pediatrics will shift
to civilian facilities" CRef. ID. "We've got to have a
large number of general practice people in my hospitals
to take oa.re of the people we have, but I can't have 80
percent of them in general practice" CRef. 2D.
1.1
The perceived ability to provide care -for only one-third
the casualties incurred in a conventional war suggests
the need -for substantial increases in the number o-f Navy
surgeons and hospi tal -based physicians (anesthesia, labora-
tory, x-ray) . Surgeons to provide immediate and potential
life-saving care and hospi tal -based medical officers to
complete the team effort required to provide this necessary-
patient care. If strictly i nterpretted , Assistant Secretary
Mayer's figures could suggest a possible tripling of these
physician specialties. Given that the number of Navy
surgeons and hospi tal -based medical officers at the end
of FYS5 was 378 and 433, respectively, this would suggest
an increase of 1622 (2 X 811) physicians within these
two specialties along with a complementary decline in
other types of Medical Department officers in order to
maintain authorized personnel ceilings.
Plans to improve the readiness of military medicine
with concurrent implications for altering the structure
of the Naval Medical Corps to a more surgically-oriented,
combat ready force may prove to be neither easily nor
promptly accomplished. In fact, no specific personnel
objectives apparently now exist to move toward this new
military medical readiness system. Although no specific
targets appear to have been established, plans do exist
to "form a panel of respected experts in medical education
to examine military training programs ... to begin meetings
this (FY86) year" CRef. 2D. Aside -from personnel , budgeting
'targets' -for medical readiness equipment have increased
sharply. DQD's 1.986 budget calls -for $500 million, up
•from $300 million in 1985, -for combat medical -facilities
CRef. 33. This thesis will analyze the factors that affect
the retention rates of surgeons and hospital-based physi-
cians. The results indicate that surgeons and hospi tal —based
physicians may be difficult specialties not only to retain,
but to increase due to higher expected civilian earnings.
In the past year, this "shift" towards a more surgical-
ly-oriented and improved Navy medical system has meant
an increase in Navy Civilian Health and Medical Program
of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) referrals to civilian
medical providers and a redoubling of efforts to simulta-
neously improve medical readiness and the quality of patient
care. Improvements in readiness and quality have been
lauded, but the additional costs generated by the referral
of eligible beneficiaries to civilian care may prove to
be quite expensive for the government and troublesome
for beneficiaries. Increases in combat medical readiness
can thus be viewed as offset by reductions in available
military facility medical care to eligible beneficiaries
other than active duty.
Given that the current physician mix is deficient—that
is, lacking in sufficient numbers of surgeons and hospi-
tal-based medical officers—how does Navy medicine correct
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this short-Fall? Specifically, how can the Navy Medical
Department improve retention and increase the numbers
and mix o-f physicians considered necessary to improve
overall operational or combat readiness?
To examine this problem, one should begin with an
understanding o-f -factors which are shown to significantly
a-f-fect retention o-f all Navy physicians in general, and
surgeons/hospi tal -based physicians in particular. An
empirical analysis which attempts to identify and explain
factors that influence retention behavior could prove
beneficial in formulating policies necessary to maintain
the appropriate number and mix of Navy physicians to realize
an operationally-ready medical force. In addition, an
accurate picture of the status of the Navy medical officer
community may suggest alternative methods for improving
the force.
Discussed in the context of other officer communities,
the retention rate for military physicians is one of the
lowest of any specific military community. Although the
retention rates of Navy nuclear officers and pilots have
been erratic and troublesome over the years, their continua-
tion rates are exemplary when compared to the Navy Medical
Corps. Table 1 shows this by comparing the continuation
rates for these selected officer populations with those
of DOD physicians and all Navy officers. This table is
presented to establish a perspective from which the retention
14
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED OFFICER COMMUNITIES








137. 1 37. 137.




SOURCE: OFFICER CONT I NUTATION DATA BASE, DEFENSE MANPOWER
DATA CENTER (DMDC)
rate -for Navy physicians may be evaluated—that is, to
suggest more meaning to "137." than this solitary -figure
alone might give. The point emphasized is that the percen-
tage o-f 'career' medical officers, judged here by the
percentage o-f the -force with 1 ength-o-f-servi ce greater
than 14 years, is comparatively very small. As shown,
medical officers exhibit overall career retention charac-
teristics that &re approximately one-third of the closely
monitored nuclear and pilot communities and 42 percent
of all Navy officers (excluding warrant officers). This
retention problem appears to be shared by all the services
as indicated by the low officer continuation rates for
all DOD physicians.
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Despite this lower retention rate -for medical o-f-ficers
vice Navy pilots and nuclear officers, recent articles
appear more concerned about the -future manning needs of
these non-medical communities. For example, a shortage
of 1,100 pilots in the grades of lieutenant and lieutenant
commander (in a total community of 12,000) has led to
a "major effort for retention" with a proposed increase
in Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) from $6,000
per year to $8,000 per year for six-year contracts CRef. 43.
Similarly, "Navy manpower officials Are looking at the
possibility of making special pays for nuclear-trained
officers and enlisted persons as one way of reversing
falling retention figures, which Are becoming a concern"
CRef. 53. Perhaps an increase in physician pay to increase
medical officer retention also needs investigation.
Compounding the problem of maintaining career medical
officers is the difficulty of sustaining the proper mix
of military physicians. The Medical Officer File, which
contains the data upon which this study is based, contains
62 separate classification categories for Navy physicians.
Similarly, the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC)
lists 52 categories of authorized Navy Medical Corps offi-
cers. Unfortunately, the unf ami 1 i ar i ty of the author
with the NMPC file and its different method of classifying
some physicians when compared to the Medical Officer File,
which is utilized in this thesis, prevented a desired
16
comparison of authorised versus actual physician billets.
However, this large number of specialties in an active
force o-f nearly 4,000 increases the complexity of retaining
not only the appropriate overall number, but the right
mix o-f physicians.
The purpose of this thesis is to formulate an explana-
tory model with which to examine and identify significant
factors affecting Navy physician retention in general,
and surgeons/hospi tal -based medical officers in particular.
The model is estimated using a logistic regression procedure
with data obtained from the Medical Officer (BUMIS) File,
END FYS5. The objective of the thesis, in part, is to
analyze the relative effects of economic versus other
factors in explaining a physician's decision to stay or
leave the Navy. This will permit an assessment of those
policies that may be more cost-effective in reaching the
Navy' s goal s.
After a brief discussion of related work which similarly
analyzed factors related to physician satisfaction and
retention in Chapter II, Chapter III identifies the charac-
teristics of the Navy medical officer community at the
end of FY85. The primary focus of this chapter will be
to document cross-tabulations of these characteristics
by physician specialty and by whether the physician remained
or left the service. Chapter IV continues this discus-
sion and shows how the explanatory models were constructed.
17
Chapter V presents the results o-f several models estimated
with the logistic regression procedure. In Chapter VI,
several policy recommendations a.re presented -for possibly
improving Navy physician retention and the structure or
mix o-f this community.
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1 1 . BACKRQUND
Numerous prior studies and data analyses have examined
personnel retention in the military service. The majority
of these studies, however, have dealt with enlisted as
opposed to officer retention behavior. Even fewer studies
have examined the retention of medical officers within
DOD, and only a handful of studies in recent years have
investigated factors surrounding Navy medical officer
decisions to remain in or leave the service. No studies
known to the author have exclusively dealt with the recruit-
ment, retention and training of surgeons and hospi tal -based
physi ci ans.
The data for this thesis is the FY85 Medical officer
File (MOF) maintained by the Naval Medical Command. The
MOF is the physician portion of the larger BUMIS File.
The BUMIS File contains military and medi cal -speci f i
c
data on all medical staff corps officers (Medical, Medical
Service, Nurse, Dental). The Medical Officer File contains
general information on the military careers of physicians
as well as specific information concerning medical training,
specialty, and commissioning program through which the
individual entered the service. Each fiscal year's data
is reconciled with the Officer Master File maintained
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by the Naval Military Personnel Command to ensure accuracy
and completeness.
Prior to the reorganization o-f the Naval Medical Depart-
ment in 1982, each medical sta-f-f corps maintained their
own data -file. Subsequent to reorganization, these data
files became centrally managed. This centralization,
together with an increase in computerized management infor-
mation systems, has dramatically improved the quantity
and quality o-f information available. As shall be noted,
an earlier study of FY82 Navy medical officer behavior
was sever ly hampered by missing values of up to 25 percent
in many relevant data fields. The same fields examined
in the FY85 MOF show less than one percent missing values
with only one field greater than four percent.
The FY85 MOF primarily contains information on medical
officers who continued, were a loss, or a pending gain
to the Naval service. As shall be described in detail
later, the data fields were cross referenced to provide
a division of officers who were either a non-obligated
stayer (N=1072) , a leaver (N=492) „ or obligated to remain
in the Navy through FYS5 <N=2833) . Obligated physicians
were eliminated from subsequent regression analysis to
form a cohort of "true" stayers and leavers. Unfortunately,
reconciliation of the FY86 Medical Officer File with NMPC
was completed in November 1986, which was too late to
be incorporated into this thesis.
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The explanatory model developed in this thesis uses
the LOGIT nonlinear estimation technique. This technique
was chosen because the dependent variable, the physician's
decision to stay or leave the Naval service in FY85, is
a binary choice variable. That is, the probability of
a physician leaving the Navy in FY85 is restricted to
values o-f either or 1.
The purpose o-F this binary choice model is to determine
the probability that a physician with a given set o-f attri-
butes, such as income or commissioning program, will make
the decision to stay or leave the Navy. The data indicate
whether a Navy physician's career decision was to stay
or leave the service in FY85. In addition, we know the
physician's specialty, commissioning program, age, race,
gender, and a number o-f other personal characteristics
that will influence the decision to leave. The LOGIT
nonlinear technique estimates the significance of these
variables on the physicians' choice to stay or leave the
Navy. For example, the LOGIT models developed will indicate
how important the officers medical specialty is in the
decision to stay in the military service. CRef. SI
A. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Two noteworthy studies utilizing the LOGIT regression
estimation technique and medical officer historical data
have been performed within the past two years. Daubert's
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analysis -focused on the retention o-f volunteer physicians
in the U.S. Air Force using historical data -from the Air
Force Uniformed Officer Record (UOR), FY 1975-FY 1982.
Daubert reached several conclusions regarding the retention
behavior of volunteer Air Force physicians.
1 . Young board certified surgeons and obstetricians,
both U.S.- and foreign-trained, are least likely
to be retained under current conditions and are most
responsive to an increase in military pay.
2. Forei gn-trai ned , hospi tal -based physicians (radiolo-
gists, anesthesiologists, pathologists) without board
certification have the highest predicted retention
rate.
3. Forei gn-trai ned subspeci al i sts and surgeons are retained
at a lower rate than U.S.—trained physicians in this
group (most of whom are older).
4. Volunteer retention increases with the physician's
military grade? i.e., given years of training, the
Air Force tends to keep older and usually more expensive
volunteers. CRef. 73
A second LOGIT regression analysis was performed by
Mull ins who examined the retention behavior of Navy physi-
cians using data obtained from the June 1983 Medical Officer
File. Although constrained by deficiencies in the data,
particularly missing values in several relevant fields,
the following findings were obtained.
1.. A physician's specialty is a key indicator of the
likelihood of staying in the Navy. Psychiatrists
are more likely to stay in the Navy than physicians
in any other specialty. Estimation results indicate
that physicians with a general medicine specialty
are the most likely to leave the Navy.
2. Medical officer retention also differed across source
of entry program. A physician who entered under the
Early Commissioning programs or the Berry Plan had
a higher probability of leaving the Navy in FY82.
3. An officer's location in the career path affects the
likelihood that he or she will leave the Navy. Physi-
cians who are eligible to retire and those who are
within one year of being free of obligation Are more
likely to leave the Navy than physicians who are not
at either o-f these decision points.
4. Factors that were -found to decrease the likelihood
of a physician leaving include being a foreign medical
school graduate, holding additional medical related
qualifications (e.g., -flight surgeon qualified), and
being a regular Navy officer. CRef. 83
Other studies have performed analyses on data obtained
from the 1978 POD Survey of Offi cers and Enlisted Person n e 1
conducted by the Rand Corporation. These efforts utilize
survey data vice actual frequency data and add much to
the understanding of physician motivation because the
medical officer's intentions and motives are analyzed
rather than strictly objective data. A possible shortcoming
of these analyses is often the lack of follow-up as to
whether a physician, in this case, actually carried out
his specified intentions.
Three reports were analyzed to gain insight into the
Navy physicians' satisfaction and military commitment.
Cain's analysis CRef. 9 3 suggested that inadequate pay
as compared to civilian opportunities, the frequency of
permanent transfers, and negative satisfaction with military
life were significant factors in the decision of medical
officers to remain on active duty. Menifee CRef. 103
similarly found that the military-civilian wage comparison
was an important factor in the retention of physicians
past their initial period of obligation. In addition.
the immediate supervision relationship and retirement
bene-fits were also important to the retention decision.
A third study examined military physician procurement
programs. In the FY85 Navy, approximately 81 percent
of both the active medical officers and losses entered
the service as a volunteer (22 percent) or through the
Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (AFHPSP)
(59 percent). In the Air Force, Hosek found that while
the "AFHPSP program represents a more stable procurement
source than direct recruiting in both numbers and composi-
tion ... it is also more expensive" CRe-f. 113. Addition-
ally, this analysis -found that FY81 U.S. Air Force AFHPSP
physicians, using a -five percent discount rate, a.r& 25-30
percent more expensive than volunteers and 40 percent
more expensive at an eight percent discount rate. However,
i -f volunteers were to be paid an additional $15, 000-20, 000
in annual pay, this cost di-f-ference with AFHPSP would
be eradicated.
B. COST OF LEAVING MODEL
The purpose o-f this section is to present and discuss
the cost o-f leaving model as specified by the Center -for
Naval Analysis (CNA) and frequently relied on by the Navy.
Although this thesis has not relied on this particular
form of analysis, discussion of the model will highlight
several factors relevant to a military physician's decision
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to remain within or leave the Naval service not presented
elsewhere. This more detailed analysis of pecuniary returns,
for example, is not a subject of this thesis while personal
characteristics such as commissioning program, gender
and citizenship have been included.
Individual choice theory assumes that service members
have full information and choose to stay in the Navy if
the monetary returns, net of costs, outweigh their distaste
for military life CRef. 123. Retention forecasts can
thus be generated based on a comparison of the present
value of the individual's expected civilian and military
earnings streams and "taste" for military life. The military
physician will remain on active duty if the expected military
returns net of civilian returns are positive. The individ-
ual's rate of time preference or discount rate is used
to calculate the present value of both earnings streams.
Higher discount rates represent less valuable future
earnings CRef. 133.
The CNA cost of leaving model, commonly known as the










- (W(t) + R(t) )
;
net present value of monetary and non—monetary
returns of staying in military medicine until
time "n" as compared with leaving in the current
period "t".
M(j) = pecuniary returns to military service -from period
"t" through "n"
.
W(n) = lump-sum payment of the present value (in period
"n") o-f the expected after-service civilian
wages realized by those staying in the military
until "n".
R(n) = lump-sum payment o-f the present value (in period
"n") o-f the expected retirement benefits realized
by those physicians staying in the military
until "n".
W(t) = present value in year "t" of the expected civilian
wages realized by those leaving the military
in year "t".
R(t) = present value in year "t" of the expected civilian
retirement payments for those physicians leaving
the military in year "t".
r = physician's individual rate of time preference
or discount rate.
CRef. 133
The first term in the bracket, M(j), is the monetary
value of total military pay discounted over time. Although
direct military compensation is easily quantifiable, total
military compensation includes such factors as state and
federal tax advantages and discounts received from military
exchanges/commissaries. As specified later, this thesis
does not consider these "fringe" benefits in calculating
the military pay of physicians due to the difficulty of
estimating the equivalent monetary value of in-kind benefits.
The measure of returns realized once the physician
stays until year "n", R(n) + W(n>, is often defined at
the year of retirement (LOS = 20). The expected stream
o-f retirement pay is calculated and discounted to the
year retirement begins. At this point, the sum is again
discounted to the current period. As would be expected,
even assuming an annual retirement pay -For Captain physi-
cians at year 20 in FY85 of $22,638, the projection o-f
future retirement increases (R(n)) and the discount rate
chosen, involve speculative assumptions about the future
status of retirement benefits, inflation, and a physician's
time preference for money. The same can be said of retired
military physician earnings (W(n)) in addition to the
fundamental difficulties of projecting whether he will
even remain within medicine and to what extent. These
difficulties in ascertaining the military retirement pay
stream would be similar to the problems of calculating
expected physician retirement flows in the private sector.
The opportunity cost foregone if the military physician
remains in the military, W(t) + R(t), composes the final
term in the equation and represents expected civilian
wages and retirment payments. As we shall see, civilian
wages in this thesis are defined as median practice net
or average "take-home" pay. This fiftieth percentile
ignores the time value of human capital, start-up costs
of establishing a practice, and work locaton. Specifically,
urban physicians tend to have higher earnings than rural
physicians which can again be differentiated by national
geographic region. In addition, incorporated physicians
net substantially more than their noni ncorporated
counterparts.
The civilian-military wage differential alone does
little to explain some o-f the difficulties encountered
by physicians in the private sector. Some of the major
influences on the enlisted retention decision appear equally
applicable to Navy physicians: low pay, geographic instabil-
ity, petty regulations, and lack of recognition CRef. 133.
The civilian sector, however, faces a different set of
difficulties such as too many competing colleagues (441,000
non-military M.D.s and D.Q.s), falling patient visit rates
(down 21 percent between 1975 and 1985) , the spread of
contract medicine, tough reimbursement rules, increasing
malpractice premiums (up 31 percent in 1985), and other
difficulties faced in the management of a business CRef. 143.
Aside from the problems of estimating both military
and civilian earnings streams, the ACOL model does little
to estimate the nonmonetary and di ffi cul t—to—quant i fy
personal "taste" factors influencing a physician's decision
to stay or leave the Navy. An example of these are policy
alternatives which may generate important psychological
factors which can influence a Navy physician's decision
to stay or leave the military. Specifically, improvements
in quality assurance programs with their accompanying
increased documentation requirements, continued emphasis
on medical readiness with its complementary field medicine
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operations, and the ramifications o-f increasing physician
tours aboard ships -from one to two years may significantly
affect a physician's taste -for military li-fe CRe-f. 123.
Complicating the ef-fect o-f these policy alternatives is
the divergent effect one policy can have on different
physi c i ans.
To improve the theoretical model previously specified,
an unobserved military taste factor must be added to the
model. This taste factor is positive (may reflect job
security or sense of belonging to a community) if one
prefers military to civilian life, and negative if the
physician has a "distaste" for military service (may reflect
poor duty stations or resource shortages). Specification
of taste factors in a model using the statistical methodol-
ogy found in the LOGIT estimation technique, for example,
and accurate measurement of the behavioral variables remains
difficult and may hinder the significance and usefulness
of any findings or conclusions attributed to them. Thus,
this empirical task was not attempted in this thesis.
III. CHARACTER IST
I
CS OF NAVAL MEDICAL OFFICERS
To provide a -framework -for better understanding retention
within the Navy physician population and particularly
surgeons and hospi tal -based doctors, all medical officers,
including those who left the service in FY85 (N=492)
,
were categorized according to individual characteristics.
The variables chosen are also delineated by whether the
individual decided to stay or leave (DELCD2) the Naval
service in FY85. Providing a frequency analysis of each
factor by physician specialty followed by a second evaluation
of the variable by DELCD2 gives the reader a reference
point and an overview of the data prior to estimation
of the LOGIT models. Missing values, as shall be explained
in detail shortly, are primarily the result of a physician
having an obligation to remain in the Navy through FY85.
A. SPECIALTY
The 62 physician specialties referred to earlier were
combined in this study to produce nine relatively homogeneous
categories with a sufficient number of observations to
accommodate analysis. Table 2 illustrates the distribution
of doctors by specialty. GMOs comprise the largest category,
but this can be misleading since medical students currently






ABSOLUTE FREO. FREO FREO
CATEGORY LABEL CODE FREO CPCT) (PCT) (PCT)
EXEC 1. 168 3.8 3.8 3.8
GMO 2. 1490 33.5 33.9 37.7
SURG 3. 4 08 9.2 9.3 47.0
08GYN 4. 208 4.7 4.7 51.7
INTMED 5. 426 9.6 9.7 61.4
PEDS 6. 240 5.4 5.5 66.9
FAMPR 7. 305 6.9 6.9 73.8
HOSPB 8. 499 11.2 11.4 85.2
OTHER 9. 651 14.6 14.8 100.0
MISSING -9. 52 1.2 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 4447 100.0 100.0
VALID CASES 4 395 MISSING CASES 52
Note:
EXEC is executive/managerial medical o-f-ficer
GMO is a general medical o-f-ficer
SURG is a surgeon
OBGYN is an obstetrician/gynecologist
INTMED is an internal medicine specialist
PEDS is a pediatrician
FAMPR is a -family practitioner
HOSPB is a radiologist, anesthesiologist, pathologist
OTHER is all other physicians
B. STAY OR LEAVE
The decision to remain or leave the Naval service
would be impossible to accurately analyze without some
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method of determining those physicians serving on active
duty under obligation. Removing obligated physicians
•from the sample leaves a cohort that was -free to depart
the service or remain on active duty in FY85. The majority
of obligated service is the result of Navy-sponsored educa-
tion programs such as medical school, internship, residency
or fellowship training. Specifically, a physician was
considered obligated and omitted from further analysis
if he or she fell into the following groups:
1. Pending admission to the Naval Medical Corps.
2. Classified as obligated to serve or with a minimum
service requirement past September 1985.
3. Completed internship subsequent to September 1984.
4,. Entered the Navy subsequent to September 1983.
5. Completed residency subsequent to September 1983.
6. Classified as 'in training'.
7. An i ntern
.
8. A graduate of the Uniformed Services University of
the Health Sciences (USUHS)
.
9. Commi ssi oned through the Armed Forces Health Professions
Scholarship Program and had completed internship subse-
quent to September 1983. CRef. 15]
Table 3 shows the number of non-obligated physicians
who left the Naval service by specialty. When compared
with Table 2, nearly 75 percent of all physicians remaining
on active duty during FY85 were obligated (N=2833) . Of
the remaining 1525 who could have left the service, approxi-
mately 30 percent did leave. The highest percentage of
TABLE 3
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY STAY OR LEAVE DECISION
COUNT I
ROW PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER ROW
COL PCT I TOTAL
TOT PCT I I . [ 2. I 3. [ 4. I 5. [ 6 . I 7. I 8. [ 9.
0. I 156 1 190 94 36 I 121 102 I 60 105 216 1058
I 12.9 I 18.0 8.9 3.4 11.4 9.6 5.7 9.7 20.4 69.4




8.9 1? 6.2 2.4 7.9 6.7 3.9 6.8 14.2
1. 21 138 30 34 53 24 43 66 58 467
I 4.5 J9.6 6.4 7.3 11.3 5.1 9.2 14.1 12.4 30.6
I 15.4 42. 1 1 24.2 48.6 ] 30.5 1 19.0 41.7 39.1 21.2
I 1 .4 1 9.0 1 2.0 2.2 1 3.5 1 1.6 2.8 4.3 3.8
COLUMN 157 328 124 70 174 12b 103 169 274 1525
TOTAL 10.
J
21.5 8.1 4.6 11.4 8.3 6.8 11.1 18.0 100.0
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leavers was among OBGYN (49"/.), GMO (42"/.), FAMPR (427.),
and HOSPB (39'/.). Those specialties less likely to leave
were EXEC (13*/.) and PEDS (197).
C. GRADE
Physicians receive credit for purposes of promotion
-for time spent in medical school (4 years), an internship
(1 year), residency training (year-f or-year ) , and even
civilian practice (1/2 year -for each year). Since 4 years
is given initially -for the completion o-f medical school,
no physician -falls below the rank o-f lieutenant (0-3).
The total creditable service cannot exceed 14 years.
Those entering service with 10 to 14 years o-f creditable
service Are lieutenant commanders (0-4). Table 4 provides
a -force structure matrix o-f the physician population by
grade and physician specialty. As anticipated, the most
senior medical o-f-ficers are EXEC (83*/. CAPT or above) while
the most junior o-f-ficers are GMO (317. LT) with the median
o-f-ficer being a Lieutenant Commander. Upon removing obligat-
ed officers from this cohort in Table 5, however, the
median officer who chose to remain on active duty is now
TABLE 4










ROW PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL. PCT I
TOT PCT I I.I 2.1 5.1 4.1 S.I S.I 7.1 8.1 9
3. I 1 1210 I 95 I 70 I 106 I 64 I 111 I 152 I 127
I 0.0 I 62.5 I 1.9 I 3.6 I 5.5 I 3.3 I 5.7 I 7.9 I 6.6
I 0.0 I 81.3 I 23.3 I 33.8 I 24.9 I 26.7 I 36.4 I 30.5 I 19.5
I 0.0 I 27.5 I 2.2 I 1.6 I 2.4 I 1.5 I 2.5 I 3.5 I 2.9
4. I 6 I 194 I 190 I 94 I 191 I 85 I 156 I 221 I 275
I 0.4 I 13.7 I 13.5 I 6.7 I 13.5 I 6.0 I 11.0 I 15.7 I 19.5
I 3.6 I 13.0 I 46.6 I 45.4 I 44.8 I 35.4 I 51.1 I 44.3 I 42.2
I 0.1 I 4.4 I 4.3 I 2.1 I 4.3 I 1.9 I 3.6 I 5.0 I 6.3
5. I 22 1 62 I 64 I 20 I 86 I 71 I 34 I 84 I 138
I 3.8 I 10.7 I 11.0 I 3.4 I 14.8 I 12.2 I 5.9 I 14.5 I 23.8
I 13.1 I 4.2 I 15.7 I 9.7 I 20.2 I 29.6 I 11.1 I 16.8 I 21.2
I 0.5 I 1.4 I 1.5 I 0.5 I 2.0 I 1.6 I 0.8 I 1.9 I 3.1
6. I 125 I 23 I 59 I 23 I 42 I 20 I 4 1 42 I 111
I 27.8 I 5.1 I 13.1 I 5.1 I 9.4 I 4.5 I 0.9 I 9.4 1 24.7
I 74.4 I 1.5 I 14.5 I 11.1 I 9.9 I 8.3 I 1.3 I 8.4 I 17.1
I 2.8 I 0.5 I 1.3 I 0.5 I 1.0 I 0.5 I 0.1 I 1.0 I 2.5
7. I 41 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
I 100.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0
I 2.4 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0
I 0.1 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0
8. I 10 I 01 01 01 II 31 01 01
I 90.9 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 9.1 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0
I 6.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.2 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0
I 0.2 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0
9. I II 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
I 100.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0
I 0.6 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0

















COLUMN 168 1489 408 207 426 240 305 499 651 4393
TOTAL 3.8 33.9 9.3 4.7 9.7 5.5 6.9 11.4 14.8 100.0
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a Commander with the highest losses experienced by
lieutenants (75'/. > .
D. LENGTH-OF-SERVICE (LOS)
An officer's rank and commissioned 1 ength-o-f -servi ce
are generally closely correlated. As previously noted,
physicians can be an exception due to creditable service
time given for medical training and any civilian practice.
Length-o-F-servi ce is particularly meaningful, independent
o-f grade, in measuring a physician's military experience.
Appendix A displays each physician specialty by length-
of-service. The calculations made at the end of this
table are provided to show the percentage of medical officers
who are beyond fourteen years of service and considered,
for the purposes of this study, to be 'career -' officers.
TABLE 5




ROW PCT ILT LCDR CDR CAPT RADML RADMU VADM ROW
COL PCT I T0TAL
1072
68.5
TOT PC T I 3 .1 4. [ 5. I 6. [ 7. I 8. [ 9.1
0. I 41 I 2(9 I 387 1 3(5 3 [ 6 1 I
I S.8 I 25.1 [ 36.1 [ 34.0 0.3 I 0.6 0.1 I
1 25.5 I 53.
»
82.5 t 87.1 75.0 [ 54.5 100.0 1
I 2.6 I 17.2 24.7 [ 23.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 I
-I- -I- 1
1. t 120 I 230 82 54 1 t 5 I
: 24. « I 46.7 16.7 11.0 0.2 1.0 ] 0.0 I
: 7«.5 I 44- 1 1 17.5 12.9 2S.0 45.5 0.0 I
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Closer examination of 'career' specialists also notes
several significant differences from the DOD FY85 overall
continuation rate of 13 percent noted earlier. Executive
medicine officers (.717.) can be assumed to have attained
their managerial positions later in their Naval service.
The GMO's very low career percentage of two percent may
indicate a strong preference for leaving the service upon
completion of obligated service if further residency or
specialist training is not obtained. Family practice
residency training is a relatively new specialty and this
suggests the reason for the low percentage (6'/.) of these
physicians in this specialty remaining past 14 years of
service. 'Career'' surgeons very closely approximate the
overall continuation rate for all Navy physicians.
Table 6 further separates this cohort into physicians
remaining in service and those who were a loss to the
Navy in FYS5. As would be anticipated, obligated service
is prominent through the first 10 years of service. Losses
are also relatively constant through the first 10 years
of service, drop to about 10 physicians per year until
year 15, become almost nonexistent until year 20 and then
rise as the physician becomes eligible to retire. The
peak losses for the active, non-obligated physician cohort
appears to occur at the seventh and eighth year of service
suggesting the time when AFHPSP physicians have completed














TOT PCT I 1.1 2.1 3.1 «.i 5.i 6 .j 7-1 3.J 9.] 10 .
0.1 1 2 1 J2 I 50 I 46 I 49 I 77 I 81 I 73 I 76
I 0.0 I 0.2 I 3.0 I 4.7 I 4.3 I 4.6 I 7.2 I 7.6 I 6.8 I 7.1
I 0.0 I 5.4 I 37.6 I 57.5 I 51.1 I 54.4 I 63.6 I 62.8 I 69.5 I 80.9
I 0.0 I 0.1 I 2.1 I 3.2 I 2.9 I 3.1 I 4.9 1 5.2 1 4.7 I 4.9
I. I 23 I 35 I 53 1 37 I 44 I 41 I 44 I 48 I 32 I 18
I 4.7 I 7.2 I 10.8 I 7.6 I 9.0 I 8.4 I 9.0 1 9.8 I 6.5 I 3.7
I 100.0 I 94 I 62.4 I 42.5 I 48.9 I 45.6 I 36.4 I 37.2 I 30.5 I 19.1




TOT PCT I 11.
I
12.1 13.1 14.1 15.1 16.1 17.1 18.1 19.1 20.
0. I 60 I 28 I 53 I 64 I 51 I 51 I 49 I 38 I 45 I 29
I 5.6 I 2.6 I 4.9 I 6.0 I 4.8 I 4.8 I 4.6 I 3.5 I 4.2 I 2.7
I 82.2 I 71.8 I 86.9 I 82.1 I 94.4 I 92.7 I 98.0 I 97.4 I 95.7 I 72.5
I 3.8 I 1.8 I 3.4 I 4.1 I 3.3 I 3.3 I 3.1 I 2.4 I 2.9 I 1.9
1. I 13 I 11 I 8 1 14 I 3 1 4 1 II II 2 1 11
I 2.7 I 2.2 I 1.6 I 2.9 I 0.6 I 0.8 I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.4 I 2.2
I 17.8 I 28.2 I 13.1 I 17.9 I 5.6 I 7.3 I 2.0 I 2.6 I 4.3 I 27.5




TOT PCT I 21.1 22.1 23.1 24.1 25.1 26.1 27.1 28.1 2».I 30.
0. I 22 I 15 I 15 I 11 I 11 I 10 I 14 I 7 1 4 1 5
I 2.1 I 1.4 I 1.4 I 1.0 I 1.0 I 0.9 I 1.3 I 0.7 I 0.4 I 0.5
I 61.1 I 71.4 I 75.0 I 91.7 I 84.6 I 76.9 I 73.7 I 70.0 I 66.7 I 83.3
I 1.4 I 1.0 I 1.0 I 0.7 I 0.7 I 0.6 I 0.9 I 0.4 I 0.3 I 0.3
1. I 14 I 6 1 5 1 II 2 1 3 1 5 1 3 1 2 1 1
I 2.9 I 1.2 I 1.0 I 0.2 I 0.4 I 0.6 I 1.0 I 0.6 I 0.4 1 0.2
I 38.9 I 28.6 I 25.0 I 8.3 I 15.4 I 23.1 I 26.3 I 30.0 I 33.3 I 16.7
I 0.9 I 0.4 I 0.3 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.2 I 0.3 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.1
r^ctI









TOT PCT I 31.1 32.1 331 J8 - 1 "- 1
j i I 1
1 1
0. I II 1 1 II II 1071
I o.l I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 68.7
'
I 33.3 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I
; I 0.1 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.1 I 0.1 I
1.1 2 1 II II 1 I 489
I 0.4 I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 31.3
I 66.7 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.0 1 0.0 I
. ,
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TABLE 7
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY ELIGIBLE TO RETIRE
COUNT I
ROW PCT 1EXEC GMO SURG OBGVN INTMED PEDS FAMPR H03PB OTHER ROW
COL PCT I T0TAL
4185
I 2.4 I 35.2 I 9.2 I 4.6 I 9.7 I 5.5 I 7.2 I 11.5 I 14.6 I 95. 6
192
4.4
1482 407 208 425 240 502 494 649 4377
33-9 9.3 4.8 9.7 5.5 6.9 11.3 14.8 100.0
TOT PCT I 1. [ 2. I 3. [ 4. I 5. [ 6. [ 7. [ 8. 1 9.1
0. I 100 1473 386 193 406 232 302 [ 480 613 I
I
I 59.5 99.4 94.8 92.8 [ 95.5 96.7 100.0 96.8 94.5 I
I
-I-
2.S 33.7 8.8 4.4 9.3 5.3 6.9 11.0 14.0 I
1. I 68 9 21 15 19 8 16 36 I
I 35.4 4.7 10.9 7.8 9.9 4.2 0.0 8.3 18.8 I
I 40.5 1 0.6 5.2 7.2 4.5 3.3 0.0 3.2 5.5 I
I
-1-
1.6 ] 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.8 I
COLUMN 168
TOTAL 3.8
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E. ELIGIBLE TO RETIRE (ELRET)
A different perspective with which to view length-of-
service is whether an officer is eligible to retire or
not. Active Duty Base Date (ADBD) was used to make this
determination as it was -for 1 ength-o-f-service. Active
duty base date contained 281 missing values and was augmented
by data -from the -following data -fields: Active Commission
Base Date (ACBD) , Professional Service Date (PSD), Date
of Pirst Naval Commission (DFNC) , Health Professional
Pay Entry Date (HPPED) , and Pay Entry Base Date (PEBD)
,
to form a new variable with 18 missing values. Table
7 separates by specialty those medical officers who have
served twenty years and are eligible to retire from those
physicians who have not. As previously stated, medical
officers who have become administrators are likely to
33
TABLE 8




ROW PCT [NCTELRET ELRET
COL PCT
TOT PCT t 0. [ 1.1
0. 937 134 I
87. S 12. S 1
68. J 70.9 I
60. 1 8.6 I
1. «J« 55 I
83.8 11.2 I








COLUMN 1371 189 1560
TOTAL 87.9 12.1 100.0
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accomplish this transition later in their military careers.
Table 8 shows that 29 percent o-f those officers eligible
to retire in FY85 did so, but this was slightly -fewer
leavers than among those officers who were not eligible
to retire (327.). Finally, combining data -from the previous
two tables shows that approximately three percent o-f all
remaining physicians in FYS5 were eligible to retire.
F. AGE
Complementing GRADE, Length-o-f-Servi ce and ELRET is
a physician's age. Appendix B shows a physician's age
by specialty and again indicates that GMOs tend to be
younger medical officers while EXECs tend to be more mature.
A surgeons median age is 35. While the median age for

















TOT PCT I 26. I 27. I 28. I 29. r 30. I 31. I 32. ( 33. I 34. 1 35.1
0. I [ I 1 7 I 9 [ 17 I 25 I 29 I 29 I 42 I
I 0.0 0.0 [ 0.0 I 0.7 [ 0.8 1.6 I 2.4 [ 2.7 [ 2.7 4.0 I
I 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.2 56.3 32.7 37.9 43.3 41.4 50.6 I
I 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.6 1.9 1.9 2.7 I
1. I 2 I 13 9 17 1 7 1 35 1 41 38 41 1 41 I
I 0.4 1 2.7 1 1.8 1 3.5 1 1 .4 1 7.2 1 8.4 1 7.8 1 8.4 1 8.4 I
I 100.0 1 100.0 ] 100.0 ] 70.8 1 43.8 1 67.3 1 62.1 1 56.7 1 58.6 1 49.4 I




TOT PCT I 36. [ 37. [ 38. [ 39. [ 40. [ 41. [ 42. I 43. [ 44. [ 45.1
0. I 42 51 [ 46 [ 55 53 67 [ 72 57 58 64 I
I 4.0 4.8 [ 4.3 [ 5.2 5.0 6.3 [ 6.8 5.4 5.5 6.0 I
I 51.2 72.9 74.2 76.4 79.1 83.8 90.0 89.1 93.5 84.2 I
I 2.7 3.3 3.0 3.5 3.4 4.3 4.6 3.7 3.7 4.1 I
1. I 40 19 16 17 14 13 1 8 7 4 12 I
I 8.2 3.9 3.3 3.5 2.9 2.7 1.6 1.4 0.8 2.5 1
I 48.8 1 27.1 25.8 23.6 ] 20.9 1 16.3 10.0 10.) 6.5 15.8 I
I 2.6 1 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.8 I




TOT PCT I 46. 47. [ 48. 1 49. [ 50. [ 51. [ 52. [ 53. t 54. 55.
0. I 48 43 33 36 36 20 28 15 22 13
I 4.5 4.0 3.1 3.4 3.4 1.9 2.6 1.4 2.1 1.2


















1. I 4 3
I 2.1 1.4 0.6 2.1 1.8 1.8 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.6
I 17.2 14.0 8.3 21.7 20.0 31.0 6.7 25.0 15.4 18.8
I
-I-





















0. I 9 [ 1
I 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
'
I 60.0 60.0 75.0 57.1 50.0 71.4 25.0 0.0 50.0 100.0
I 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
1. I 6 6 3 6 3 2 3 I 1 1 [
I 1.2 1.2 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.0
I 40.0 40.0 25.0 «2.9 50.0 28.6 75.0 100.0 50.0 0.0

























COLUMN 15 15 12 14 6 7 4 1 2 1 1550
TOTAL 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 100.0
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leavers to be 35 and the median age for non-obligated
physicians remaining on active duty to be 42.
G. SOURCE OF ENTRY (SOE)
Most medical officers are commissioned through one
o-f several programs unique to the medical community.
Some of these programs are relatively new (eg. the Uniformed
Services University o-f the Health Sciences (USUHS) and
the Armed Forces Health Profession Scholarship Program
(AFHPSP) initiated in 1972 and 1976, respectively. Others,
such as the Berry Plan <BP) and the Medi cal /Osteopathi
c
Scholarship Program (MOSP) were terminated in 1973 and
1977, respectively CRef. 15]. Volunteers (VOL), the Early
Commissioning Program (ECP) , miscellaneous medical officer
accessions, and interservice transfers comprise the
remai nder
.
Table 10 depicts the FY85 physician community inventory
by source of entry and physician specialty with PRIOR
representing those physicians who entered the Navy via
the BP (110), ECP (285) or MOSP (223). As shown, almost
35 percent of the losses and continuances for FY85 entered
the Naval service via the AFHPSP or were volunteers.
In addition, GMOs, which again includes physicians in
medical school and internship, composed nearly 81 percent
of AFHPSP. The newness of the USUHS and its potential
as a future source of physicians i s an area, to be covered
41
TABLE 10
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY SOURCE OF ENTRY
COUNT I
ROW PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT I
TOT PCT r 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9
1. I 66 I 217 I 122 I 37 I 102 I 67 I 43 1 132 I 198
I 6.7 I 22.1 I 12.4 I 3.8 I 10.4 I 6.3 I 4.4 I 13.4 I 20.1
I 40.5 I 15.9 I 30.7 I 18.3 I 24.2 I 28.9 I 14.5 I 27.0 I 31.5
I 1.6 I 5.2 I 2.9 I 0.9 I 2.4 I 1.6 I 1.0 I 3.1 I 4.7
2. I 91 I 43 I 74 I 34 I 69 I 54 I 35 I 71 I 138
I 14.9 I 7.1 I 12.2 I 5.6 I 11.3 I 8.9 I 5.7 I 11.7 I 22.7
I 55.8 I 3.1 I 18.6 I 16.8 I 16.4 I 23.3 I 11.8 I 14.5 I 22.0
I 2.2 I 1.0 1 1.8 I 0.8 I 1.6 I 1.3 I 0.8 I 1.7 I 3.3
3. I 6 1 1106 I 202 I 131 I 250 I 111 I 218 I 285 I 292
I 0.2 I 42.5 I 7.8 I 5.0 I 9.6 I 4.3 I 8.4 I 11.0 I 11.2
I 3.7 I 81.0 I 50.8 I 64.9 I 59.4 I 47.8 I 73.6 I 58.4 I 46.5









COLUMN 163 1366 398 202 421 232 296 488 628 4194
TOTAL 3.9 32.6 9.5 4.8 10.0 5.5 7.1 11. S 15.0 100.0
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TABLE 11
STAY OR LEAVE BY SOURCE OF ENTRY
LEAVE
COUNT I
ROW PCT I VOL PRIOR AFHPSP ROW
COL PCT I TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1. [ 2. [ 3.
0. I 460 [ 391 [ 198 1049
I 43.9 37.3 18.9 68.2
I 74.8 84.8 43.0
I 29.9 25.4 12.9
1. I 155 70 263 488
I 31.8 1 14.3 53.9 1 31.8
I 25.2 1 15.2 57.0 1
I 10.1 1 4.6 1 17.1 ]
COLUMN 615 461 461 1S37
TOTAL 40.0 30.0 30.0 100.0
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in subsequent research as these o-f-ficers begin to complete
their obligated service. O-f the 223 missing values noted,
170 Are USUHS students or graduates, all o-f whom were
42
obligated in FYS5. Additionally, miscellaneous officer
accessions and transfers were omitted due to the small
size o-f this cohort (30).
Table 11 reveals that by -far the largest percent o-f
leavers occurred within AFHPSP (57%) -followed by volun-
teers (25'/.). Conversely, PRIOR medical officers were
the most likely to stay (85"/.). Although many PRIOR (Berry
Plan) physicians were originally draft motivated and less
inclined to become career officers, separate frequency
analysis indicates those who did remain now appear much
less likely to leave. This is shown in Table 12 and is
a change from the behavior of 1982 Berry Plan physicians
noted earlier in Mullins research CRef. 83.
TABLE 12





ROW PCT I VOL ECP BP MISC AFHPSP MOSP
COL PCT I
TOT PCT I 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 «
0. I 460 I 209 I 97 I 22 I 198 I 85
I 43.0 I 19.5 1 9.1 I 2.1 I 18.5 I 7.9
I 74.8 I 83.6 I 92.4 I 95.7 I 43.0 I 80.2
I 29.5 I 13.4 I 6.2 1 1.4 I 12.7 I 5.4
1. I 155 I 41 I 8 1 1 I 263 I 21
I J1.7 I 8.4 I 1.6 I 0.2 I 53.8 I 4.3
I 25.2 I 16.4 I 7.6 I 4.
J
I 57.0 I 19.8







COLUMN 615 250 105 23 461 106 1560
TOTAL 39.4 16.0 6.7 1.5 29.6 6.8 100.0
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TABLE 13
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY SUBSPECIALTY CODE (BDCERT)
COUNT
ROW PCT I EXEC GMO SURG OBGVN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
TOT PCT t I. 2. [ 3. 4. 5. t 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. I 1157 115 90 93 79 93 168 168 1963
FULLY TRAINED 0.0 58.9 5.9 4.6 4.7 4.0 4.7 8.6 8.6 44.7
0.0 77.7 28.2 43.3 21.8 [ 32.9 30.5 33.7 25.8
0.0 26.3 2.6 2.0 2.1 1.8 2.1 3.8 3.8
2. 1J2 46 170 59 256 126 134 206 306 1435
BOARD CERT 9.2 3.2 11.8 4.1 17.8 8.8 9.3 14.4 21.3 32.7
78.6 3.1 41.7 28.4 60.1 52.5 43.9 41.3 47.0
3.0 1.0 3.9 1.3 5.8 2.9 3.0 4.7 7.0
3. 35 14 49
SIGEXP 71.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 1.1
20.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2
0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
4. 1 28 7 123 59 77 35 78 125 163 948
IN TRAINING 0.1 30.3 13.0 6.2 8.1 3.7 8.2 13.2 17.2 21.6
0.6 19.3 30.1 28.4 18.1 14.6 25.6 25.1 25.0
0.0 6.5 2.8 1.3 1.8 0.8 1.8 2.8 3.7
COLUMN 1(8 1490 408 208 426 240 30S <»» 651 439S
TOTAL 3.8 33.9 9.3 4.7 9.7 5.5 6.9 11.4 14.8 100.0
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H. SUBSPECIALTY CODE/BOARD CERTIFICATION (BDCERT)
In addition to specialty, each physician is classified
as to his status within his field. Primarily, a physician
is in training (22"/.), fully trained and not board certified
in his selected specialty (457.), or board certified (33"/.).
The remainder of physicians are in executive medicine
or OTHER specialty (17.). The training category is one
of the primary : determinants of whether a physician was
"obligated" and hence not eligible to leave the service
under usual circumstances. Table 13 provides a crosstabu-
lation of each physician specialty by training status
and level of expertise. Noteworthy is the larger number
44
TABLE 14
STAY OR LEAVE DECISION BY SUBSPECIALTY CODE (BDCERT)
COUNT I
ROW PCT IFULLV TR BOARD CE SIGEXP IN TRAIN ROM
COL PCT IAINED RT ING TOTAL
STAY
TOT PCT I I. [ 2. 3. 4.
0. I 343 696 33 [ 1072
I 32.0 66.9 3.1 0.0 68.5




21.9 44.5 2.1 0.0
1. I 210 227 9 16 492
I 48.8 46. 1 1 .3 3.3 31.5




15.3 14.5 0.6 1.0
COLUMN 583 923 42 16 1564
TOTAL 37.3 59.0 2.7 1 .0 100.0
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of board certi-fied physicians in the Navy (33%) than Daubert
found in the Air Force (26V.) [Ref. 73. The largest numbers
o-f board certi-fied physicians Are -found in OTHER (306),
HOSPB (206) and SURG (170). In addition, 79 percent o-f
executive medicine officers Are board certi-fied special-
ists. Subspecialty code is a combination o-f subspecialty
code data -field one and two on the Medical O-f-ficer File.
In FYS5, this suggests the number o-f board certi-fied physi-
cians serving in their "primary" or -first subspecialty
was 974. With the 'in training' category considered to
be obligated, Table 14 indicates that 41 percent o-f -fully
trained physicians that could leave the Navy did so while
only 25 percent of board certified physicians departed
from the Navy in FYS5. This is contrary to expectations.
Board certified physicians might be anticipated to leave
45
TABLE 15
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
COUNT I
ROW PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT I
TOT PCT I 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9
0. I 21 I 84 I 7 1 2 1 11 I II 9 1 15 I <i2
I 10.9 I 15.8 I 5.6 I 1.0 I 5.7 I 0.5 I 4.7 I 7.8 I 21.9
I 22.
J
I 14.8 I 5.3 I 5.1 I 8.8 I 2.0 I 7.9 I 10.0 I 16.5
I 1.4 I 5.5 I 0.5 I 0.1 I 0.7 I 0.1 I 0.6 I 1.0 I 2.7
1. I 43 I 323 I 34 I 7 1 24 I 4 1 16 I 54 I 116
I 6.9 I 52.0 I 5.5 I 1.1 I 3.9 I 0.6 I 2.6 I 8.7 I 18.7
I 45.7 I 56.9 I 25.6 I 17.9 I 19.2 I 8.0 I 14.0 I 36.0 I 45.5
I 2.8 I 21.1 I 2.2 I 0.5 I 1.6 I 0.3 I 1.0 I 3.5 I 7.6
2. I 30 I 161 I 92 I 30 I 90 I 45 I 89 I 81 I 97
I 4.2 I 22.5 I 12.9 I 4.2 I 12.6 I 6.3 I 12.4 I 11.3 I 13.6
I 31.9 I 28.3 I 69.2 I 76.9 I 72.0 I 90.0 I 78.1 I 54.0 I 38.0









COLUMN 94 568 133 39 125 50 114 150 255 1528
TOTAL 6.2 37.2 8.7 2.6 8.2 3.3 7.5 9.8 16.7 100.0
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the Naval service more frequently because o-f their increased
earnings potential (an additional one-third net) within
the private sector CRef. 16D.
I. ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
A physician may volunteer or be directed to receive
additional medical training in combat medicine or other
military-specific areas. For example, medical officers
may receive special training in aviation ar undersea medi-
cine. Table 15 indicates the frequency with which various
physician specialties have received additional qualifica-
tions. As shown, of 1528 additionally qualified medical
officers, 40 percent of physicians were trained in aviation
46
TABLE 16




ROW PCT I UNDERSEA FLIGHT OTHER
COL PCT
TOT PCT I 0. I 1. [ 2.1
0. [ 71 I 216 168 I
15.
<
I 47.5 36.9 I
77.2 78.8 75.3 I
12.1 36.7 28.5 I






22.8 21 .2 1 21.7 I
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(FLIGHT) medicine (Naval aviator, -flight surgeon or aviation
medicine) while 13 percent received undersea medicine
training (undersea medicine or saturation diving) by the
end o-f FY85. The OTHER category primarily includes advanced
cardiac life support training and the combat casualty
care course (C4) . Physicians who have not received any
mi 1 i tary-speci -f i c training or were obligated compose the
bulk o-f values (2919). As noted in Table 16, only 589
non-obligated physicians have received additional qualifica-
tions, o-f which 48 percent involve aviation medicine.
J. REGULAR OR RESERVE
Most physicians enter the Naval service as a reserve
officer on active duty. Two years after the completion
47
TABLE 17
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY REGULAR OR RESERVE
RESERV
COUNT I
ROM PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGVN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT I
T° T PCT I I.I 2.1 J.I «.i 5.1 t.j 7-I 8-I ,
0- I 13 I 1222 I 284 I 151 I 269 I 113 I 197 I 332 I 303
I 0.5 I 42.4 I 9.8 I 5.2 I 9.3 I 3.9 I 6.8 I 11.5 I 10.5
I 7.7 I 82.0 I 69.6 I 72.6 I 63.1 I 47.1 I 64.6 I 66.5 I 46.5
I 0.5 I 27.8 I 6.5 I 3.4 I 6.1 I 2.6 I 4.5 I 7.6 I 6.9
1- I 155 1 268 I 124 I 57 I 157 I 127 I 108 1 167 I 348
I 10.3 I 17.7 I 8.2 I 3.8 I 10.4 I 8.4 I 7.1 I 11.1 I 23.0
I 92.3 I 18.0 I 30.4 I 27.4 I 36.9 I 52.9 1 35.4 1 33.5 I 53.5







COLUMN 168 1490 4 08 208 426 240 305 499 651 4395
TOTAL 3.8 33.9 9.3 4.7 9.7 5.5 6.9 11.4 14.8 100.0
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o-f an internship, a physician may apply -for augmentation
into the regular Navy. Acceptance into the regular Navy
involves a two year commitment and is there-fore indicative
that an o-f-ficer intends to remain in the service -for at
least those several years. Unfortunately, the author
could not devise a method to remove those physicians obli-
gated by augmentation from the sample.
Table 17 shows that two—thirds o-f Navy physicians
(again, active and losses combined) are reserve officers.
As previously discussed, the typically more senior executive
medicine officers are regular Navy (REGULAR) while the
usually younger and junior GMOs are USNR (RESERVE). In
removing obligated physicians, Table IS displays that
60 percent of reserve officers left the Navy while a much
43
TABLE 18





ROW PCT [RESERV REGULAR
COL PCT
TOT PCT [ 0. [ 1.1
0. 248 824 I
23.1 76.9 I
39.9 87. S I
15.9 52.7 I
1. 1 374 118 I
76.0 24.0 I










COLUMN 622 942 1564
TOTAL 39.8 60.2 100.0
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smaller 13 percent of regular Naval officers decided to
leave in FY85.
K. FOREIGN OR U.S. MEDICAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
The medical school a military officer attends may
have a bearing on his decision to continue in the Navy.
Foreign medical graduates (FMGRAD) generally have lower
civilian earning potential than their U.S. educated peers
(USGRAD) . Consequently, earlier studies have shown that
foreign medical graduates tend to remain in the military
longer. Table 19 depicts the percent of foreign and U.S.
educated Naval physicians in FY85. As shown, 94 percent
of Navy physicians Are U.S. educated and this level appears
consistent across all specialties. Foreign medical graduates
appear concentrated among the GMO (24*/.), HOSPB (197.) and
49
TABLE 19





TOT PCT I 1. [ 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.1
0. I 10 64 17 13 30 27 9 50 43 I
FOREIGN MED GRAD I 3.7 23.9 6.3 4.9 11.2 10.1 3.4 18.7 17.9 I
I 6.0 4.5 4.3 6.3 7.1 11.4 3.0 10.2 7.4 I
I 0.2 1.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.2 1.2 1.1 I
1. I 153 1347 381 192 391 209 294 439 593 I
U.S. MED GRAD I 3.9 33.6 9.5 4.8 9.8 5.2 7.3 11.0 14.9 I
I 94.0 95.5 95.7 93.7 [ 92.9 88.6 97.0 89.8 92.6 I
I
-I-







COLUMN 168 1411 3 98 205 421 236 303 489 646 4277
TOTAL 3.9 33.0 9.3 4.8 9.8 5.5 7.1 11.4 15.1 100.0
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TABLE 20
STAY OR LEAVE DECISION BY U.S. OR FOREIGN MEDICAL SCHOOL
COUNT I
ROW PCT IFOREION U.S. MED ROM
COL PCT I MED GRAD GRAD TOTAL
STAY
LEAVE
TOT PCT I 0. I 1.
0. I 172 I 891 [ 1063
I 16.2 83.8 68.6
I 81.1 66.6
I 11.1 57.5
1. I 40 446 486
I 8.2 91.8 31.4
I 18.9 33.4
I 2.6 ] 28.8
COLUMN 212 1337 1549
TOTAL 13.7 86.' 100.0
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OTHER (187.) categories with little representation among
FAMPR iZV.) and EXEC (4*/.). Removing obligated physicians
from the -frequency sample in Table 20, however,, reveals
that 33 percent o-f U.S. medical school graduates le-ft
50
the service while only 19 percent of foreign educated
medical officers left.
L. CITIZENSHIP
Complementing the foreign medical school frequency
variable is whether a medical officer is a U.S citizen
(USCIT) or not. For this analysis, naturalized citizens
and aliens were grouped together to obtain the non—citizen
variable (NOTCIT). With minor numerical changes, non—citi-
zen frequencies presented in Tables 21 and 22 mirrored
those of foreign medical graduates. This would be expected
since foreign medical graduates are more likely to be
non—ci t i zens.
TABLE 21
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY CITIZENSHIP
COUNT I
ROW PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGVN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER ROW
CX PCT I TOTAL
250
5.7
OT PCT I i. 1 2. t 3. 1 «. [ 5. t. [ 7. [ 8. [ 9.
0. I 3 55 20 10 25 29 9 47 52
I 1.2 22.0 3.0 4.0 10.0 11.6 3.6 18.8 20.8
I 1.8 3.8 5.0 4.9 6.0 12.1 3.0 9.5 8.0
I 0.1 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 C.7 0.2 1.1 1.2
1. I 165 1410 384 195 395 211 295 447 597
I 4.0 34.4 9.4 4.8 9.6 5.1 7.2 10.9 14.6
I 98.2 S4.Z 95.0 95.1 94.0 87.9 97.0 90.5 92.0
:
-i-
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TABLE 22
STAY OR LEAVE DECISION BY CITIZENSHIP
COUNT 1
ROW PCT ! NOTCH USC IT ROW
COL PCT I TOTAL
TOT PCT I 0. 1.
0. I 164 925 1067






1. 41 450 491
I 8.4 91.6 31.5




COLUMN 185 1373 1558
TOTAL 11.9 88.1 100.0
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS » 2889
M. RACE, GENDER
Race and gender have been significant in many previous
studies o-f reenlistment behavior. Table 23 shows that
75 percent o-f Navy Physicians are Caucasian (CAUC) while
Table 24 illustrates that 89 percent are male (MALE).
With regard to race, nearly 97 percent o-f executive medi-
cine, 85 percent o-f surgeons and 88 percent o-f OTHER are
Caucasian. Conversely, the largest number o-f non-cauca-
sians (NOCAUC) are GMOs (407.) which is nearly double the
percent -found in the other categories. Examining gender,
-female physicians appear inclined to be GMOs (377), but
when compared with males, represent 23 percent o-f all
pediatricians and 18 percent o-f OBGYN. Removing obligated
physicians and missing values -from the sample in Tables
25 and 26 reveals that nearly an equal percentage o-f
TABLE 23
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY RACE
COUNT I
ROW PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT I
TOT PCT I |.l 2.1 3.1 «.i 5 . r 4 .i 7-I 8-I ,
0.1 5 1 577 I 59 I 49 I 86 I 49 I 50 I 107 I 79
I 0.5 I 54.4 I 5.6 I 4.6 I 8.1 I 4.6 I 4.7 I 10.1 I 7.4
I S.O I 39.9 I 15.0 I 24.6 I 20.8 I 21.2 I 16.8 I 22.2 I 12.4
I 0.1 I 13.5 I 1.4 I 1.1 I 2.0 I 1.1 I 1.2 I 2.5 I 1.9
'• I 162 I 870 I 335 I 150 I 327 I 182 I 247 I 374 I 557
I 5.1 1 27.2 I 10.5 I 4.7 I 10.2 I 5.7 I 7.7 I 11.7 I 17.4
I 97.0 I 60.1 I 85.0 I 7S.4 I 79.2 I 78.8 I 83.2 I 77.8 I 87.6
I 3.8 [ 20.4 I 7.9 I 3.5 I 7.7 I 4.3 I 5.8 I 8.8 I 13.1
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TABLE 24
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY GENDER
MALE
COUNT I
ROM PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT I
TOT PCT I 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 »
0. I 3 I 181 I 25 I 38 I 47 I 54 I 31 I 59 I 51
I 0.6 I 17.0 I 5.1 I 7.8 I 9.6 I 11.0 I 6.3 I 12.1 1 10.4
I 1.8 I 12.2 I 6.1 I 18.3 I 11.0 I 22.5 I 10.2 I 11.9 I 7.9
I 0.1 I 4.1 I 0.6 I 0.9 I 1.1 I 1.2 I 0.7 I 1.3 I 1.2
1. I 165 I 1302 I 382 I 170 I 379 I 186 I 272 I 438 I 598
I 4.2 I 33.5 I 9.8 I 4.4 I 9.7 I 4.8 I 7.0 I 11.3 I 15.4
I 98.2 I 87.8 I 93.9 I 81.7 I 89.0 I 77.5 I 89.8 I 88.1 I 92.1







COLUMN 167 1447 314 199 413 231 297 481 636 4265







COLUMN 168 1483 407 208 426 240 303 497 649 4381
TOTAL 3.8 33.9 9.3 4.7 9.7 5.5 6.9 11.3 14.8 100.0
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TABLE 25




ROW PCT 1NONCAUC CAUC
COL PCT I
TOT PCT I 0.1 1
0. I i:2 I 920
I 12.5 I 87.
5
I 66.7 I 69.4
I 8.7 I 60.4
1. I 66 I 405
I 14.0 I 86.0
I 33.3 I 30.6
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TABLE 26





ROW PCT FEMALE MALE
COL PCT
TOT PCT 0. 1.1
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Caucasians (31V.) and non-caucasi ans (337.) departed the
Naval service in FY85. Similarly, 37 percent o-f females
(FEMALE) and 31 percent o-f males le-ft Navy medicine.
TABLE 27
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY MARITAL STATUS
NEW SINGLE
COUNT I
BOW PCT IEXEC G'C SURG OBGVN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT I
TOT PCT I I.I 2.1 5.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9
0. I 21 I 752 I 151 I 57 I 169 I 79 I 96 I 203 I 221
I 1.2 I 43.0 I 8.6 I 3.3 I 9.7 I 1.5 I 5.5 I 11.6 I 12.6
I 12.7 I 53.3 I 38.5 I 28.9 I 4 1 . 4 I 34.3 I 32.5 I 43.3 I 34.8
I 0.5 I 17.9 I 3.6 I 1.4 I 4.0 I 1.9 I 2.3 I 4.8 I 5.3
1. I 141 I 650 I 238 I 139 I 235 I 148 I 196 I 259 I 408
I 5.8 I 26.9 I 9.9 I 5.8 1 9.7 I 6.1 I 8.1 I 10.7 I 16.9
I 85.5 I 46.0 I 60.7 I 70.6 1 57.6 I 64.3 I 66.4 I 55.2 I 64.3
I 3.4 I 15.5 I 5.7 I 3.3 I 5.6 I 3.5 I 4.7 I 6.2 I 9.7
2. I 3 1 10 I 3 1 II 4 1 3 1 3 1 7 1 6
E I 7.5 I 25.0 I 7.5 I 2.5 I 10.0 I 7.5 I 7.5 I 17.5 1 15.0
I 1.8 I 0.7 I 0.8 I 0.5 I 1.0 I 1.3 I 1.0 I 1.5 I 0.9
i o.i i 0.2 i o.i ; o.o i o.i i o.i i o.i i 0.2 i o.i









COLUMN 165 1412 392 197 4 08 230 295 469 635 4203
TOTAL 3.9 33.6 9.3 4.7 9.7 5.5 7.0 11.2 15.1 100.0
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N. MARITAL STATUS
A physician's marital status may influence his decision
to remain in the Navy. MARRIED officers may be more risk
adverse than SINGLE officers when deciding to depart the
Navy -for a civilian medical practice due to -financial
concerns surrounding family commitments. The category
'new single' shown in Table 27 contains those individuals
divorced, widowed or separated. Por purposes of military
pay, more fully discussed later, new singles were grouped
with married officers (with dependents). However, when
examining the decision to stay or leave the military service,
new singles were grouped with singles. As noted, singles
compose 42 percent of all physi ci ans-53 percent of GMOs
TABLE 28
STAY OR LEAVE DECISION BY MARITAL STATUS
COUNT I
ROW PCT ISINGLE MARRIED NEW SING ROW
COL PCT I LE TOTAL
TOT PCT I 0. [ 1. [ 2.
DELCD2
0. I 246 [ 783 1 17 1046
STAY I 23.
5























10. 5 1 20.2 ] 0.4 1
23405 1089 1517
TOTAL 26.7 71.8 1.5 100.0
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and 13 percent of EXEC. This suggests that single o-f-ficers
Are probably younger and trained more recently. Removing
obligated physicians -from the sample in Table 28 indicates
that 39 percent of singles and 28 percent of married non-ob-
ligated medical officers departed the Navy in FY85.
0. OSTEOPATH (OSTEO)
A physician who has been trained as an osteopath rather
than receiving a medical degree (D.O. vs M.D.) may be
influenced to remain in the Navy longer. Lower civilian
earning potential, particularly for GMO osteopaths, and
restriction of hospital privileges to osteopathic insti-
tutions may lead an osteopath to remain within the military
service where he essentially receives the same treatment
as his M.D. counterparts. Table 29 shows only seven percent
56
TABLE 29
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY OSTEOPATH
COUNT I
ROW PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT I
T0T PCT I l-I 2-1 5-1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9
GS45 I I I 1 i i , j j
"• I 158 I 936 1 564 I 184 I 289 I 222 I 265 I 433 I 595
NOT OSTEOPATH I 4.5 I 26.4 I 10.
J
I 5.2 I 11.0 I 6.3 I 7.5 I 12.2 I 16.8
I 95.2 I 89.0 I 97.8 I 93.4 I 95.8 I 96.9 I 92.0 I 94.3 I 94 .
»
I 4.2 I 2-.
7
I 9.6 I 4.8 I 10.2 I 5.8 I 7.0 I 11.4 I 15.7
'•I 8 1 116 I 8 1 13 I 17 I 7 1 23 I 26 I 32
OSTEOPATH I 3.2 I 46.4 I 3.2 I 5.2 I 6.8 I 2.8 I 9.2 I 10.4 I 12.8
I 4.8 I 11.0 I 2.2 I 6.6 I 4.2 I 3.1 I 8.0 I 5.7 I 5.1







COLUMN 166 1052 372 197 406 229 288 459 627 3796
TOTAL 4.4 27.7 9.8 5.2 10.7 6.0 7.6 12.1 16.5 1C0.0
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of the physician cohort to be osteopathic and 46 percent
o-f these 250 to be engaged as GMOs with a large number
o-f missing values. Removing obligated physicians in Table
30 shows 46 o-f 100 eligible osteopathic physicians to
have left the military in FY85 which is higher than the
30 percent of non-osteopaths who departed.
P. MILITARY/CIVILIAN INCOME RATIO (LINCR)
Military compensation is composed of basic pay, basic
allowance for subsistence (BAS) , basic allowance for quarters
(BAG), and variable housing allowance (VHA). For this
study of FY85 data, all officers were given BAG. This
approximation avoided the problems involved in identifying
those medical officers residing in government quarters
or estimating their value. For VHA, an average was taken
57
TABLE 30
STAY OR LEAVE DECISION BY OSTEOPATH
COUNT I
ROW PCT INOT OSTE OSTEOPAT ROW
COL PCT IOPATH H TOTAL
TOT PCT I 0.1 1.1
DELCD2 1 1—. - ._.
0. I 993 I 54
STAY I 94.8 I 5.2
I 69.8 I 54.0
I 65.2 I J.
5
-I J
1. I 129 I 46
LEAVE I 90.3 I 9.7
I 30.2 I 66.0
I 28.2 I 3.0
-I 1
COLUMN 1422 loo 1522
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of this allowance -for the Naval Medical Command Washington,
D.C. and the areas where the Navy's four largest hospitals
are located (San Diego, CA, Oakland, CA, Pensacola, FL,
and Portsmouth, VA> . As was done -for BAQ, the VHA rate
was also differentiated for single medical officers (without
dependents rate) and married or newly single officers
(with dependents rate) CRef. 173.
To obtain the military pay variable for Navy physicians
several special pays must be added to the military compensa-
tion figures previously noted. Table 31 shows the multiple
special pays authorized by the Uniformed Services Health
Professional Pay Act of 1980. Table 32 shows the amount




SPECIAL PAY FOR PHYSICIANS
VARIABLE ADDITIONAL BOARD INCENTIVE
SPECIAL SPECIAL CERT. SPECIAL
LOS PAY PAY PAY PAY ( 1
)
< 6 $5,000 $9,000 $2,000 <$8, 000
<8 $10, 000 $9 , 000 $2,000 <$8,000
< 1 $9,500 $9, 000 $2,000 <$8, 000
< 1 2 $9, 000 $10, 000 $2,500 <$8,000
< 1
4
$8,000 $10, 000 $3, 000 < $8 , 000
<1S $7,000 $10, 000 $4, 000 < $8 , 000
$6,000 $10,000 $5,000 < $8 , 000
••-.TO $5,000 $10, 000 $5,000 <$8,000
INTERN $ 1 , 200
RESID. BY LOS BY LOS
FLAG $ 1 , 000 $10, 000 BY LOS
(1) Not to exceed 6 percent o-f total special pays
TABLE 32
FY85 SPECIAL INCENTIVE PAY BY PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY
AMOUNT SPECIALTY
$8000 NEUROSURGEONS, PLASTIC SURGEONS, THORACIC CARDIO-
VASCULAR SURGEONS, COLON-RECTAL SURGEONS, GENERAL
SURGEONS, ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, SURGICAL ONCOLOGISTS,
PEDIATRIC SURGEONS, ORTHOPEDIC SURGEONS, AND PE-
RIPHERAL VASCULAR SURGEONS
$5000 AEROSPACE PREVENTIVE MEDICINE OFFICERS, UROLOGISTS
AND OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGISTS (EAR, NOSE, AND THROAT
SPECIALIST)
SOURCE: NAVAL MEDICAL COMMAND, WASHINGTON, D.C.
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TABLE 33
MEDIAN CIVILIAN PHYSICIAN EARNINGS BY SPECIALTY
SPECIALTY 1985 NET EARNINGS















All surgical specialists 132,640
All non-surgical specialists (1) 94,680
All M.D.s 102,520
Osteopaths (2) 74,000
(1) Does not include Family Pratitioners and General Practi
t i oners.
(2) General Practitioners only.
SOURCE: MEDICAL ECONOMICS, September 8, 1986 CRe-f. 143
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TABLE 34





(1) Source: MEDICAL ECONOMICS, March 7, 1983 CRef. 19]
(2) Source: MEDICAL ECONOMICS, September 8, 1986 CRe-f. 14]
(3) Estimate o-f Author
1981 NET < 1
)
1985 NET (2) INCREASE
127,310 1 50 , 000 . 18
108,950 137,1 70 .26
1 04 , 620 125,544(3) .2(3)
Civilian pay was estimated using a survey o-f 1985
annual physician earnings conducted in January 1986 by
MEDICAL ECONOMICS and shown in Table 33 CRe-f. 14]. For
the specialty EXEC, the annual base salary -for presidents/ad-
ministrators -for 1984 was increased by the 6.4 percent
estimated to occur <*91,831)in 1985 CRe-f. 18]. For patholo-
gists (hospital based specialty), annual net earning were
estimated to be $125,544 based on the estimates provided
in Table 34.
A frequency analysis was conducted to examine the
military and expected civilian earnings -for stayers and
leavers by subspecialty. These comparisons are presented
in Tables 35 and 36. Additional calculations Are -found
in Table 37 which also depict the difference in military
earnings and expected civilian earnings. Some error is
61
TABLE 35
STAYERS AND LEAVERS MILITARY EARNINGS





























TOTAL CASES • 4447



















































































































anticipated in the civilian earnings calculations due
to unprogrammed losses both -from the Navy and -from medical
school training programs. The size o-f the loss category
for FY85 (N=492) , however, is anticipated to accomodate




STAYERS AND LEAVERS EXPECTED CIVILIAN EARNINGS
VARIABLE
FOR ENTIRE POPULATION
CODE VALUE LABEL SUM
115070249.0000
MEAN STO DEV VARIANCE































MISSING CASES • 2926 OR ts.t PCT.
14417467.0000 91831.0000 0.0 0.0 157)
12489016.0000 91831.0000 0.0 0.0 136)
1928451.0000 91831. 0000 0.0 0.0 21)
23556140.0000 71817.5000 779.4202 607495.8716 328)
13629500.0000 71734.2105 665.1078 442368,4211 190)
9926640.0000 71932.1739 903.8068 816866.7725 138)
16447360.0000 132640.0000 0.0 0.0 124)
12468160.0000 132640.0000 0.0 0.0 94)
3979200.0000 132640.0000 0.0 0.0 30)
8498700.0000 121410.0000 0.0 0.0 70)
4370760.0000 121410.0000 0.0 0.0 36)
4127940.0000 121410.0000 0.0 0.0 34)
15505990.0000 89630.0000 0.0 0.0 173)
107S5600.0000 89630.0000 0.0 0.0 120)
47S0390.0000 89630.0000 0.0 0.0 53)
9967860.0000 79110.0000 0.0 0.0 126)
8069220.0000 79110.0000 0.0 0.0 102)
1898640.0000 79110.0000 0.0 0.0 24)
7882590.0000 76530.0000 0.0 0.0 103)
4591800.0000 76530.0000 0.0 0.0 60)
3290790.0000 76530.0000 0.0 0.0 43)
22946502.0000 137404.2036 10408.4899 108336662.3920 167)
13979608.0000 135724.3495 10453.3118 109271727.8766 103)
8966894.0000 140107.7188 9823.6331 96503767.9831 64)
25847640.0000 94680.0000 0.0 0.0 273)
20450880.0000 94680.0000 0.0 0.0 { 216)
5396760.0000 94 680.0000 0.0 0.0 57)
6j
TABLE 37

























I V . EMPI R ICAL ANALYSIS
A. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Three models were developed and estimated using the
LOGIT nonlinear regression technique. This technique
was chosen because the dependent variable (DELCD2) is
restricted to two values—either a physician stayed in
the Navy (0) or he was a loss (1>. The models were designed
to estimate the e-f-fect that a number of variables had
on a physician's decision to stay or leave. Most of the
explanatory variables selected were dichotomous variables,
coded 1 it the condition holds and if it does not.
Table 38 lists all the variables considered in this study.
The strengths o-f this model s^re several. First, there
has been a dramatic increase in the completeness o-f the
data over the past several years. Table 39 shows the
number of missing values in the file used. Aside from
additional military-specific medical training (ADD QUAD
and Osteopath, the largest number of missing observations
is only four percent of the sample.
B. PROBLEMS OF MULT I COLL I NEAR I TY
Multiple regression models assume that there is no
linear relationship between the independent variables.
This means that the effect of an independent variable
65
TABLE 38





Obstetr i ci an /Gynecol ogi st
Internal Medicine
Family Practice











Regular or Reserve O-f-ficer
Flight Medicine Qual i -fi cation
Undersea Medicine Qualification
Board Certification
Ci t i zenshi p
Grade
Length-of -Servi ce












































Note: Many physicians, particularly junior medical o-f-ficers,
may not have received any mi 1 i tary-speci -f i c training such
as aviation or undersea medical education.
(such as LOS) on the decision variable (STAY or LEAVE)
is assumed to occur while all other variables sire held
constant. I -f a linear relationship does exist—that is,
if an independent variable is strongly related (either
positively or negatively) to one or more o-f the other
independent variables—than a change in this independent
variable causes a corresponding change in the other, corre-
lated variable. This causes a problem o-f mul ti col 1 i near i ty.
Mul ti col 1 i near i ty or strong correlation between independent
variables (such as LOS and GRADE) makes the coe-f -f i ci ents

























Appendix C lists the simple correlation coefficients
of all variables within the model. As can be seen, AGE,
GRADE and LOS s.re highly correlated with a number of the
other independent variables. In addition, NOTCIT is highly
correlated with the foreign medical graduate variable
(.69). For this reason, these four variables (ARE, GRADE,
LOS, NOTCIT) were omitted from the model.
Potential mul ti col 1 i near i ty between other variables
necessitated the construction of two models to appropriately
consider the remaining variables. Table 40 presents the
simple correlation coefficients between other combina-
tions of explanatory variables. Although most of the
correlations noted Are not surprising, the statistical
problems they create can cause difficulties for the entire
model. The income ratio (LINCR) , for example, is negative-
ly correlated with HOSPB—that is, the military-civilian
wage ratio for hospi tal -based physicians tends to be low
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due to the high median civilian earnings these physicians
can expect. Similarly, BDCERT physicians, by definition,
are not GMOs.
Model One is brie-fly presented at the beginning o-f
the next chapter to exemplify the problems associated
with mul ticol 1 i near i ty. With many variables either posi-
tively or negatively correlated with one another, the
model coefficients become difficult to interpret. For
example, many variables that were expected to have a signifi-
cant effect are insignificant, while other variables,
later shown to be insignificant, are erroneously presented
as significant.
The second LOGIT explanatory model, Model Two, omits
LI NCR and FMGRAD in order to alleviate mul t i col 1 i near-
ity. AFHPSP was also omitted and became the comparison
variable against which VOL and PRIOR were evaluated.
Similarly, GMO was omitted and became the base case against
which the other specialties were evaluated.
This base case distinction is important to remember
for it means that the effect of a given variable on the
decision to stay or leave must be evaluated as compared
to the base case variable. For example, the effect of
the decision to stay or leave for physicians with aviation
or undersea medicine gual i f i cat i ons is only by comparison
with physicians with OTHER qualifications. As noted in
the frequency analysis earlier, we know that nearly 25
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percent of OTHER physicians who were eligible to leave
the service did leave in FYB5. Hence, any tendency -for
aviation or undersea medicine physicians to stay or leave
is in comparison to the characteristics embodied within
the 25 percent who departed (or 75 percent who stayed)
.
The third LOGIT model reinstated the variables in
Model Two but omitted REGULAR, BDCERT, HOSPB and VOL.
HOSPB thus became the comparison variable against which
the other specialties were evaluated. VOL similarly became
the base case against which PRIOR and AFHPSP source o-f





Table 41 presents the mean value -for all variables
in Model One discussed above. As noted, 2899 (73"/.) o-f
the potential cohort of stayers were deleted -from those
remaining on active duty through FY85 primarily because
they were obligated. Among this cohort o-f stayers and
leavers, the average age was 41, grade was lieutenant
commander, AFHPSP was 29 percent, LOS was 11 years, etc.
OBGYN is annotated as having "limited dispersion" because
of the small sample size (.045) ERef. 20D.
Previous analysis suggests that the entering cohort
of physicians, noted earlier in the frequencies presented,
does not necessarily indicate the mean percentage of physi-
cians analyzed in this logistic regression. For example,
16S physicians were initially identified as executive
medicine officers while 408 physicians were classified
as surgeons. After eliminating those physicians who primari-
ly have obligations to the Naval service, 10 percent of
all physicians were executive medicine officers while
only 8 percent of the surgeons remained. This variation
suggests very few executive medicine officers Are obligated
while surgeons may either be in a four year residency
or serving under obligation.
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TABLE 41
MODEL ONE MEAN OBSERVATIONS
1548 OBSERVATIONS
1062 DELCD2 •
48* DELCD2 » 1
2899 OBSERVATIONS DELETED DUE TO MISSING VALUES























AGE 41.3391 26 67 41
GRADE 4.78359 3
LOS 11.3075 1 3» 38
NOTCH 0.118863 1 1
WARNING: VARIABLE HAS LIMITED DISPERSION.
IT MAY BE A BAD CANDIDATE FOR THE MODEL.
-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD FOR MODEL CONTAINING INTERCEPT ONLY" 1926.42
MODEL CHI-SQUARE. 537.06 WITH 25 D.F.
CONVERGENCE OBTAINED IN 6 ITERATIONS.
MAX ABSOLUTE DERIVATIVES .2536D-04 .
MODEL CHI-SQUARE* 605.10 WITH 25 D.F.
(SCORE STAT.) P»0.0
R« 0.537.
-2 LOG L» 1321.32.
(-2 LOG L.R. ) P»0.0
Table 41 also gives an R-value of .53. This denotes
the explanatory ability of the variables to indicate whether
a physician will remain in the Navy or leave. "R" has
a value of zero if the model is of no value and "1" if
the model predicts perfectly.
TABLE 42
MODEL ONE LOGISTIC REGRESSION PROCEDURE
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR CHI -SQUARE P R
INTERCEPT 3.89209093 0.86119696 20.42 0.0000
LI NCR 1.04714355 0.86557996 1.52 0.2176 0.000
PRIOR
-0.18649019 0.24726031 0.S7 0.4507 0.000
AFHPSP 0.49063416 0.21135308 5.39 0.0203 0.042
EXEC 0.38151464 0.42770405 0.80 0.3724 0.000
SURG 0.57496027 0.5432S675 1.12 0.2899 0.000
OBGVN 1.35199872 0.57771458 5.48 0.0193 0.042
INTMED 0.56519362 0.34881536 2.63 0.1052 0.018
PEDS -0. 15104414 0.35286626 0.18 0.6686 0.000
FAMPR 0.64679580 0.32709746 3.91 0.0480 0.031
HOSPB 1.40606096 0.62080246 5.13 0.0235 0.040





-0.42535744 0.33721618 1.59 0.2072 0.000
BDCERT
-0.18196471 0.17815169 1.04 0.3071 0.000
FLIGHT
-0.65926075 0.20953360 9.89 0.0017 -0.064
UNDER
-0.17122797 0.31832396 0.29 0.5906 0.000
OSTEO 0.22182665 0.27750434 0.64 0.4241 0.000
NOCAUC
-0.07227427 0.22870738 0.10 0.7520 0.000
ELRET 2.71491725 0.35545631 58.34 0.0000 0.171
SINGLE
-0.25831506 0.16795229 2.37 0.1240 -0.014
FEMALE
-0.10897246 0.24492540 0.20 0.6564 0.000
AGE 0.01065028 0.01744128 0.37 0.5414 0.000
GRADE
-0.85567663 0.17175030 24.82 0.0000 -0.109
LOS -0.02380293 0.02869135 0.69 0.4068 0.000




NEGATIVE I 935 I 127
I I
POSITIVE I 180 I 306
|





SENSITIVITY! 63. OX SPECIFICITY: 88
.
OX CORRECT: 80. 2*
FALSE POSITIVE RATE: 29.3* FALSE NEGATIVE RATE: 16. 1*
FRACTION OF CONCORDANT PAIRS OF PREDICTED PROBABILITIES AND RESPONSES :0.855
RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN PREDICTED PROBABILITY AND RESPONSE :0.717
In reviewing the logistic regression results in Table
42, we -first examine the individual R-statistics given
-For each independent variable. As can be seen, the R-values
are between -1 and +1 and they provide a measure o-f the
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contribution o-f the variables independent o-f the sample
size. The R-value is zero i -f the variable provides no
partial contribution to the model. None o-f the R-values
Are +1 which would indicate it is perfectly related to
the dependent variable nor -1 which would indicate a perfect
inverse relationship. An example o-f a perfectly related
variable would be to compare any variable with itself
(monthly income and annual income). Conversely, civilian
computer programmers would probably be nearly perfectly
unrelated to the model specified, provided they were not
also physicians. CRef. 201
Next, a review of the P-statistics indicates the signifi-
cance of the estimated coefficient of the independent
variables examined. As would be expected, the previously
examined variables which did not contribute to the model
(R—statistic = 0), were not significant at the 10 percent
level. On the other hand, the most significant variable,
whether a physician was designated as a reserve or augmented
into the regular Navy, contributes significantly to the
explanatory power of the model. The more significant
(lower) the P—statistic, the more confidence can be associ-
ated with the estimated coefficient (Beta). Since the
purpose of this inquiry is to determine significant charac-
teristics which accounted for the decision of a physician
to remain or leave the Naval service, the P-statistic
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helps establish the level o-f confidence with which the
independent variable's coefficient can be judged.
After reviewing the explanatory ability of the variables
chosen (R-stati sti c ) and the significance of the Beta
coefficients (P-stat i st i c ) , the Beta coefficients themselves
are examined. These coefficients should be viewed in
terms of relative magnitude rather than absolute size.
Positive coefficients indicate "more likely to leave"
while negative coefficients suggest "less likely to leave"
the Naval service.
Examination of the independent variables shows that
several are unexpectedly insignificant, while others are
surprisingly significant. LOS, AGE, PRIOR, and FMGRAD
Are among the variables evaluated as not contributing
to the model while the one variable previously evaluated
as least likely to be of significance, OBGYN, is signifi-
cant. In addition, LINCR, although not statistically
significant, has a positive coefficient which indicates
that an increase in military pay is likely to influence
physicians to leave the Naval service. These results,
particularly in view of the many high standard deviations
indicate the disturbing effect that mul ti col 1 i near i ty
can have on a model
.
To rectify as many of these correlation problems as
possible, Models Two and Three were estimated. This is
not meant to infer that the variables eliminated are not
significant (AGE, GRADE, LOS, NOTCH) in the physicians
decision to remain in or leave the Navy. The contrary
is true. Individually and in modi-fied regressions, the
higher a physicians age, grade and 1 ength-of -servi ce,
the less likely he is to leave the Navy and these results
were significant at the one percent level. Aliens and
naturalized citizens (NOTCIT) were also significantly
less likely to leave the Navy.
B. MODEL TWO
A second regression model was constructed which omitted
the income variable (LINCR) and FMGRAD. AFHPSP and GMO
were similarly deleted -from this model to -form the compari-
son variables -for source of entry and physician subspecialty,
respectively. Mean observations remained virtually identi-
cal and Are not repeated. Overall, the reader should
first note in Table 43 that every standard error in Model
2 has been reduced. This suggests that Model Two has
succeeded in reducing mul ti col 1 i near i ty problems throughout
the model. Secondly, this model's explanatory R—value
remains approximately the same (.51).
In examining physician specialty and level of signifi-
cance <P—value), both VOL and PRIOR physicians were less
likely to leave the Navy than the comparison variable
AFHPSP. Previous frequency analysis showed that 57 percent
of non-obligated AFHPSP physicians left the service
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TABLE 43
MODEL TWO LOGISTIC REGRESSION PROCEDURE
-2 LOO LIKELIHOOD FOR MODEL CONTAINING INTERCEPT ONLY« 1910.15
MO0EL CHI-SOUARE« 495.28 WITH 19 D.F.
CONVERGENCE OBTAINED IN 6 ITERATIONS.
MAX ABSOLUTE DERIVATIVES. 3880D-07.
MOOEL CHI-SQUARE* S4S.65 WITH 19 D.F.
(SCORE STAT.) P»0.0
R» 0.512.
-2 LOG L« 1394.49.
(-2 LOG L.R. ) P = 0.0
VARIABLE BETA 3TD. ERROR CHI -SQUARE P R
INTERCEPT 1.21900311 0.19129687 40.61 0.0000
VOL -0.86162232 0.15801292 29.94 0.0000 -0.120
PRIOR -1.02168504 0.22123142 21.33 0.0000 -0.100
EXEC -0.73006504 0.33118577 4.86 0.0275 -0.038
SURG -0.67263983 0.29109453 5.34 0.0208 -0.041
08GYN 0.37738246 0.33113302 1.30 0.2544 0.000
INTMED -0.19074392 0.26086497 0.53 0.4647 0.000
PEDS -0.62900305 0.32278300 3.80 0.0513 -0.030
FAMPR 0.40193324 0.31281836 1.65 0.1988 0.000
HOSPB 0.20685903 0.25646186 0.65 0.4199 0.000
OTHER -0.33101385 0.24525727 1.82 0.1771 0.000
REGULAR -2.42801922 0.16985671 204.33 -0.323
BDCERT -0.24026018 0.16409024 2.14 0.1431 -0.009
FLIGHT -0.77027467 0.20145271 14.62 0.0001 -0.081
UNDER -0.29842618 0.31217661 0.91 0.3391 0.000
OSTEO 0.25439257 0.26704654 0.91 0.3408 0.000
NOCAUC -0.28900454 0.20469772 1.99 0.1580 0.000
ELRET 2.01339114 0.24703569 66.43 0.0000 0.182
SINGLE -0.10400695 0.15828152 0.43 0.5111 0.000





NEGATIVE 916 155 1071
POSITIVE 179 310 489
TOTAL 1095 465 1560
SENSITIVITYi 63.4% SPECIFICITY: 85. SX CORRECTi 78. 4X
FALSE POSITIVE RATEi 33. 3X FALSE NEGATIVE RATEi U.3X
FRACTION OF CONCORDANT PAIRS OF PREDICTED PROBABILITIES AND RESPONSES




in FY85. This can be stated conversely: AFHPSP medical
officers were the most likely to leave the Navy in FYS5
when compared to other commissioning programs.
Of the significant (P < .1) subspecialty variables,
EXEC (-.73), SURG (-.67), and PEDS (-.63) were less likely
to leave the service in FY85 than GMOs. However, previous
•frequency analysis showed that 42 percent of non-obligated
GMOs left the Navy. The other specialties were not statis-
tically significant in a comparison with GMO as to whether
they were more or less likely to leave the Naval service.
Of the remaining variables, REGULAR (-2.4) and FLIGHT
(-.7) were less likely to leave. REGULAR was the most
significant variable in the model with the highest explana-
tory ability (R=.32). FLIGHT must be compared to non-obli-
gated physicians with OTHER additional qualifications
who left the military service with a frequency of 25 percent
in FY85. Also significant were physicians eligible to
retire who were more likely to leave (2.0) than those
medical officers with less that 20 years—of —servi ce.
Non—caucasi ans were less likely to leave the Navy in
FY85 than Caucasians, but this statistic was not signifi-
cant. This may suggest that the civilian opportunities
for non-caucasi ans Are not as good as for Caucasians.
Although this appears intuitively correct, this independent
variable is statistically insignificant. Using a similar
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explanation, females are less likely to leave the Navy
than males, but again the statistic is not si gni f i cant
.
Board certification was not evaluated as a significant
variable in the model although the indication is that
they are less likely to leave the Naval service than physi-
cians who are not board certified. This result may suggest
problems within the model resulting from those physicians
who are board certified but not performing in their special-
ty. As noted earlier, studies have indicated that the
increased earnings potential of board certified physicians
increases the probability of their leaving the military.
The substitute for 1 ength—of -servi ce, ELRET, would
be anticipated to show that those physicians who had served
twenty years would be more likely to leave the service
than those who had not. Although physician retention
is not strong, the model estimates a strong liklihood
that physicians eligible to retire are more likely to
leave the Navy than those who are not. This result was
also statistically highly significant.
The remainder of Table 43 deals with the predicted
probabilities given in the model. Sensitivity (637.) is
the proportion of true positives that were predicted to
be positive. Specificity is the proportion of true negatives
(36"/.) that were predicted to be negative. The false positive
(337.) and false negative (167.) rates are also found within
Table 43. An additional way of assessing the predictive
power o-f the model is given by "concordant pairs" which
measures the concordance between predicted probabilities
and responses (84*/.) .
The estimated coef -f i ci ents indicate the tendency of
the independent variable only to be "more likely" or "less
likely" to leave the Naval service. To provide a numerical
interpretation o-f the significant (P < .1) variables in
Model Two, elasticities were calculated for the Beta coeffi-
cients according to the following formula:
ELASTICITY = Beta * X(i) * (1-P);
where:
Beta = estimated coefficient
X(i) = mean of the independent variable (i)
P = probability of leaving = 489/156 = .313
CRef. 63
As shown in Table 44, a ten percent increase in the
number of volunteers leads to a two percent decrease in
the average probability of their leaving. Similarly,
a ten percent increase in the number of augmented or regular
Navy physicians indicates a ten percent average decrease
in the probability of their leaving. Conversely, a ten
percent increase in the number or retirement eligible
physicians would lead to a 1,6 percent increase in the
number of medical officers departing the Navy. As can
be seen from the table, the largest elasticity is associated
with a physician's status as a reserve or REGULAR Naval
officer. This suggests that medical officers who apply
for and successfully augment into the regular Navy, and
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TABLE 44
ELASTICITY OF SELECTED VARIABLES IN MODEL TWO
EFFECT ON Y OF A
1 07. RISE IN X ( i )
TY ON LEAVING PROB.VARIABLE BETA ELASTI
VOL -.865 -. 23^




REGULAR -2.428 - 1 . 006
FLIGHT -.770 -.093









incur a two year commitment in so doing, were less likely
to leave in FY85.
Table 45 shows the final parameter estimates given
in a stepwise regression. Here variables have been added
to the model to maximize its explanatory power (R-value)
or maximize the significance of the individual coeffi-
cient. This partial correlation deletes variables not
significant at the 10 percent level and lists the most
significant variables after the impact of all previous
variables has been eliminated.
As can be seen, the stepwise regression estimated
two additional physician specialties (OTHER and INTMED)
as being statistically significant in the model. Both
of these physicians specialties were estimated to be less
likely to leave the Naval service in FY85 than GMO. In
comparing the predictive nature of this reduced model,
all the statistical indicators remained virtually
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TABLE 45
MODEL TWO STEPWISE REGRESSION PROCEDURE
NO ADDITIONAL VARIABLES MET THE 0.1000 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL FOR ENTRY.
FINAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR CHI -SQUARE P R
INTERCEPT 1.20189825 0.12907732 86.70
REGULAR -2.41744161 0.16641493 211.02
. -0.328
ELRET 1.99246582 0.24150066 68.07 0.0000 0.185
VOL -0.87905542 0.15266279 33.16 0.0000 -0.127
PRIOR -1 .00388264 0.21677838 21.45 0.0000 -0.100
FLIGHT -0.78911577 0.19119036 17.04 0.0000 -0.088
SURG -0.88995464 0.25250111 12.42 0.0004 -0.073
EXEC -0.9419J705 0.29463563 10.22 0.0014 -0.065
PEDS -0.86961410 0.28210036 9.50 0.0021 -0.062
OTHER -0.55422478 0.19883091 7.77 0.0053 -0.055




NEGATIVE I 917 I 154 I 1071
TRUE I I |
POSITIVE I 190 I 29) I 489
TOTAL (1107 I 453 I 1560
SENSITIVITYi MUX SPECIFICITYi 85 . 6X CORRECT! 77.9*
FALSE POSITIVE RATEi 34 . OX FALSE NEGATIVE RATEl 17. 2X
FRACTION OF CONCORDANT PAIRS OF PREDICTED PROBABILITIES AND RESPONSES i0.82«
RANK CORRELATION BETWEEN PREDICTED PROBABILITY AND RESPONSE .0.680
the same. This suggests that the eliminated variables
add little to the predictive power of the original model.
The stepwise regression also altered the coe-f -f i ci ents
and intercept -for all the selected variables. In the
case o-f surgeons (-.88 vs previous "".67), -for example,
they are still less likely to leave the Navy than GMOs,
but this revised coe-f
-f i ci ent has not changed the SURG
relationship with the other subspecialties estimated as
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si gni-f icant
. Again, the coefficients -for physician specialty
are not to be assessed in terms of absolute size, but
relative magnitude.
C. MODEL THREE
A -final model was estimated using the LOGIT nonlinear
estimation technique which included the previously omitted
variables in Model Two (LINCR, AFHPSP, GMO, FMGRAD) and
elimated the -following: VOL, HOSPB, REGULAR, BDCERT.
As in Model Two, AGE, GRADE, LOS and NOTCIT were also
eliminated. 0-f initial importance is the drop in the
overall explanatory power o-f the model (R—value) -from
.51 to .39. This probably is the result o-f eliminating
REGULAR -from the new model when it was the most significant
variable in both Models One and Two. Secondly, Table
46 shows that the majority o-f standard errors have again
dropped marginally.
The first variable, the natural log of the military-ci-
vilian income ratio is statistically significant. This
positive coefficient indicates that a rise in military
income narrows the gap between military and estimated
civilian earnings, and thus suggests that Navy physicians
would be less likely to leave the service if given an
increase in pay. The new significance of LINCR also indi-
cates that the model has reduced mul ti col 1 i near i ty.
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TABLE 46
MODEL THREE LOGISTIC REGRESSION PROCEDURE
-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD FOR MODEL CONTAINING INTERCEPT ONLY- 19X0. 15
MODEL CHI-SQUARE» 309.53 WITH 19 D.F.
CONVERGENCE OBTAINED IN 6 ITERATIONS.
MAX ABSOLUTE DER I VATI VE=0 . ?059D- 1 1
.
MODEL CHI-SOLARE= 328.30 WITH 19 D.F.
(SCORE STAT. ) P = 0.0
R» 0.387.
-2 LOG L» 1611.85.
(-2 LOG L.R. ) P = 0.0
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR CHI-SQUARE P R
INTERCEPT -1.17965256 0.31281837 14.22 0.0002
LI NCR -1.44424797 0.39040027 13.69 0.0002 -0.078
PRIOR -0.86952330 0.18992278 20.96 0.0000 -0.099
AFHPSP 1.01058088 0.16127029 39.27 0.0000 0.139
EXEC -1. 04789*15 0.32848394 10.18 0.0014 -0.065
GMO 0.25531381 0.25369299 1.01 0.3142 0.000
SURG -0.91613138 0.27422365 11.16 0.0008 -0.069
OBGYN -0.10514007 0.30655022 0.12 0.7316 0.000
INTMED -0.33809133 0.26119740 1.68 0.195S 0.000
PEDS -0.72090467 0.32570189 4.90 0.0269 -0.039
FAMPR 0.21056949 0.31947163 0.43 0.5098 0.000
OTHER -0.65292366 0.24367731 7.18 0.0074 -0.052
FMGRAD -0.65159938 0.22727468 8.22 0.0041 -0.057
FLIGHT -0.83667437 0.18727277 19.96 0.0000 -0.096
UNDER -0.62272411 0.28942488 4.(3 0.0314 -0.037
OSTEO 0.33454868 0.24021564 1.94 0.1637 0.000
NOCAUC -0.07800417 0.19479397 0.16 . 6888 0.000
ELRET 1.42998225 0.22877291 39.07 0.0000 0.138
SINGLE 0.00562052 0.14453855 0.00 0.9690 0.000
FEMALE -0.00784212 0.21870423 0.00 0.9714 0.000
CLASS" C 1CATI0N TABLE
PREDICTED
NEGATIVE POSITIVE TOTAL
NEGATIVE 94 7 124 1071
POSITIVE 273 216 489
TOTAL 1220 340 1560
SENSITIVITVt 44. 2X SPECIFICITY: 88. 4X CORRECTt 74.6*
FALSE POSITIVE RATEi 36.5X FALSE NEGATIVE RATE: 22. 4X
FRACTION OF CONCORDANT PAIRS OF PREDICTED PROBABILITIES AND RESPONSES




For a physician's source o-f entry, both PRIOR and
AFHPSP Are statistically significant when compared to
VOL. Non-obligated volunteer physicians departed the
Navy at the 25 percent rate in FY85. The coefficients
indicate that AFHPSP physicians were again more likely
to leave the Naval service than volunteers or PRIOR commis-
sioned officers.
In examining specialty, EXEC (1.0), SURG (-.91), PEDS
(-.72) and OTHER (-.65) Are all less likely to leave the
military service than hospi tal -based physicians. Previous
frequency analysis showed hospi tal -based physicians who
were not obligated to have left the Navy at the rate of
39 percent in FY85. These results Are quite similar to
those found in Model Two in terms of relative magnitude
which suggests a consistency in Models Two and Three.
When compared with physicians who have received addi-
tional qualifications, FLIGHT remains significant and
continues to suggest that these physicians Are less likely
to leave the Navy (—.83) In addition, physicians with
undersea medicine qualifications are also statistically
significant and less likely to leave the Navy (-.62).
UNDER was not significant in Model Two although the coeffi-
cient suggested they were less likely to leave. Aerospace
and undersea medicine qualifications involve voluntary
education in subspecialties not easily transferred to
the private sector. This may suggest why physicians who
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seek this training are less likely to leave the Naval
servi ce.
0-f the other variables included in this model, FMGRAD
(-.65) and ELRET (1.4) were significant at the one percent
level. Foreign medical graduates is one of the variables
added to this model and suggests these physicians are
less likely to leave the Navy that their U.S. educated
peers. Physicians eligible to retire, as in Model Two,
continue to be inclined to leave the Navy.
The change in variables from the previous model has
also altered the predicted probabilities given. Sensitivity
or the proportion of true positives has dropped from 63
percent to 44 percent. Specificity or the proportion
of true positives has dropped from 88 to 86 percent.
Similarly, the false positive rate has risen slightly
(33 to 37 percent) and the false negative rate has also
risen from 16 to 22 percent. Lastly, the concordance
between predicted probabilities and responses has dropped
from 84 to 77 percent. These results, combined with the
now lower R-value of Model Three previously noted, suggest
that the reduction in correlation sought by establishing
this model has been at the expense of its overall explanatory
power
.
Table 47 presents the elasticities for the significant
variables in Model Three. An increase in AFHPSP now leads
to an overal increase in the average probability of leaving.
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This is the result o-f changing the comparison variable
to VOL -from the previous model. Similarly, a ten percent
increase in -foreign medical graduates reduces the average
probability o-f leaving. Lastly, a ten percent increase
in the mi 1 i tary—ci vi 1 i an income ratio increases the proba-
bility of physicians remaining in service. The income
variable also has the largest elasticity in Model Three
which suggests the importance o-f military pay in the Navy
physician's retention decision in FY85.
Table 48 presents the final parameter estimates given
in a stepwise regression. As occurred in Model 2, the
internal medicine specialty has become significant at
the -five percent level. This suggests that the elimination
of non-contributing variables accomplished by the stepwise




MODEL THREE STEPWISE REGRESSION PROCEDURE
FINAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR CHI-SQUARE P R
INTERCEPT -0.90425307 0.18898130 22.90 0.0000
AFHPSP 1 . 05818628 0.15384099 47.31 0.0000 0.153
LI NCR -1.14441725 0.29817040 14.78 0.0001 -0.081
ELRET 1.34374473 0.22078974 37.04 0.0000 0.134
PRIOR -0.90174837 0.18488115 23.28 0.0000 -0.105
FLIGHT -0.79532080 0.18021333 19.48 0.0000 -0.095
FMGRAD -0. 70195124 0.21512315 10.45 0.0011 -0.047
SURG -0.99325442 0.24924208 15.88 0.0001 -0.085
UNDER -0.59399041 0.23441710 4.30 0.0381 -0.034
EXEC -1.19042579 0.28054441 18.01 0.0000 -0.091
OTHER -0.79874577 0.18118281 19.43 0.0000 -0.095
PEDS -0.91299731 0.24243139 12.08 0.0005 -0.072







94« I 125 I 1071
I I
272 I 217 I 489
1218 I 342 I 1540
SENSITIVITY! 44.4* SPECIFICITYi 88. 3* CORRECTi 74. 4*
FALSE POSITIVE RATEt 34. 5X FALSE NEGATIVE RATEi 22. 3X
FRACTION OF CONCORDANT PAIRS OF PREDICTED PROBABILITIES AND RESPONSES







The explanatory models developed in this thesis are
presented as a potential starting point -From which -Further
analysis can be performed. As noted earlier, the data
set permitted only a cross-sectional analysis of the Naval
Medical Corps. The combination of several years data
would establish an historical data base which could allow
the measurement o-f variables such as income that -fluctuate
over time rather than across the -force. A time series
analysis would provide a larger data set as more individuals
would eventually reach their stay/leave decision point.
In addition, -further research could -focus on separate
portions of the BUMIS File in examining the retention
behavior o-f Medical Service, Nurse or Dental Corps Officers.
For example, the stay/leave decision for dental officers
would be anticipated to be guite different from the behavior
of medical officers. Similarly, sources of entry, pay
differential and obligated service for nonmedical staff
corps officers may suggest an entirely different set of
incentives and behavior for these non-physician health
care professionals.
Several significant conclusions can be drawn from
the explanatory models developed in this study. First,
a physician's specialty plays an important role in explaining
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loss behavior. Specifically, executive medicine officers,
surgeons, pediatricians, OTHER, and internists were less
likely to leave the Navy than general medical officers
and hospi tal -based physicians. These results, however,
must be tempered by the frequency analysis, which indicated
that both 42 percent of non-obligated general medical
officers and 39 percent of non-obligated hospi tal -based
physicians who could leave the Navy in FY85 did so.
The results from the analysis of source of entry are
also significant. AFHPSP, the major source of entry for
Navy physicians in FY85, are more likely to leave military
service than directly commissioned volunteers, while medical
officers previously commissioned under the Berry, Early
Commissioning and Medi cal —Osteopathic Scholarship Programs
are less likely to leave than both the aforementioned.
The retention behavior of USUHS graduates was not evaluated
due to the obligation under which these officers were
serving in FY85. This could indicate the current mainstay
of Navy physician recruitment/procurement, AFHPSP, concur-
rently poses a future retention problem if these medical
officers continue to depart shortly after completing their
obligated service.
Of the other significant variables, physicians were
less likely to leave if they received an increase in military
pay, were augmented into the regular Navy, had received
aviation medicine training, or were a foreign medical
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graduate. The following variables were not significant
at the 10 percent level: race, gender, single, osteopath,
marital status, and board certification. Physicians having
undersea medicine qualifications were less likely to leave
the Navy in Model Two and Three, but this factor was signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level only in Model Three.
Several variables were omitted from the models due
to correlation problems with the other independent vari-
ables. Each of these variables, in separate modified
regressions, however, was statitically significant. Specifi-
cally, the higher a medical officer's GRADE, AGE and LOS,
the less likely he was to leave the Navy in FYS5. Similarly,
aliens and naturalized citizens were also less likely
to leave the service.
Based on the previous analysis, several recommendations
Are suggested in view of the low retention rate for military
medical officer officers, the additional difficulty of
maintaining the appropriate mix of physicians by specialty,
and the desired alteration of the current Naval Medical
Corps to a more surgically-oriented force. The first
recommendation discusses the importance of increasing
military pay for certain physician specialties. The second
addresses the advantages of lengthening obligated service
time for some Navy-sponsored residency training programs.
A major objective of this thesis was to analyze the
relative effect of economic versus non-economic factors
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in explaining retention. The correctly specified models
verify the importance of economic variables. Table 47
indicated that the mi 1 i tary—ci vi 1 i an pay variable had
the highest elasticity with respect to retention. Indeed,
one would find it difficult to discount the significance
of military pay as a recruiting and retention factor when
the average Navy medical officer in FY85 earned 64 percent
of, or $34,000 less than, the pay of his civilian peer.
This large pay differential becomes even more significant
when one notes that the two specialties paticularly essen-
tial to the concept of operational readiness, surgeons
and hospi tal -based physicians, earn $60,000 and $73,000
less than their average non-military counterparts, respec-
tively. To say that this pay differential makes recruitment
of these two groups difficult would be to understate the
problem dramatically. In addition, the majority of Navy
surgeons and some hospi tal -based physicians were receiving
the maximum amount of special incentive pay allowed under
the Uniformed Services Health Professional Pay Act of
1980. In light of the aforementioned, a review of military
pay for physicians, particularly surgeons and hospi tal -based
specialists, is recommended.
The composition of any work force is the direct result
of recruiting and retention efforts. The military-civilian
pay differential makes the recruitment of volunteer surgeons
and hospi tal -based physicians extraordinarily difficult.
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The retention o-f career Navy physicians that remained
for 20 years o-f service or more in FY85 was 134 or 3.4
percent of all medical officers remaining in service.
The bulk of Navy physicians entering the service and remain-
ing on active duty is composed of obligated AFHPSP medical
officers and those who have similarly incurred an obligation




Approximately 260 residencies a.re offered each year
within Navy military hospitals. An additional 70 total
residencies &re sponsored through civilian facilities
at any one time. Physician residencies essentially range
from two to four years duration. A medical officer incurs
a two year obligation upon completion of his military
residency regardless of time spent in training. For civilian
residencies, the obligation is year-f or-year
.
Increasing the obligated service time for example,
to a year-f or-year program might prove to be a cost-effective
plan for retaining future specialists. General surgeons,
for example, might be obligated an additional two to three
years, anesthesiologists one year, radiologists one or
two years, and pathologists two years. Although the "reten-
tion" of specialists through increased obligation would
not affect the force for at least four years after enactment,
consideration of extending obligation past the present
two years for Navy-sponsored residencies may be feasible.
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0-f course, the cost of this plan in terms of its effect
on recruiting would have to be evaluated. For it to be
effective, physician supply would have to be fairly inelastic
with respect to obligation time. However, it may be possible
to offset any negative effects on recruiting with additional
pay, especially bonuses in those areas of critical need.
This thesis began by presenting the current overall
problem of retaining military physicians and the additional
difficulties of altering the mix of medical officers to
substantially increase the number, although not targeted,
of surgeons and hospi tal -based doctors. Subsequent frequency
and regression analysis suggested a number of significant
factors which improved or lessened the probability of
a physician remaining in the Naval service. For surgeons
and hospi tal -based medical officers, particularly identified
as important in raising the level of combat readiness
desired in Navy medicine, two policy recommendations—in-
creasing military pay and lengthening obligated service
for Navy-sponsored residency programs—were presented.
As the reality of increasing military pay for surgeons
and hospi tal -based physicians by gnl_y hal f the estimated
FY85 shortfall with median civilian earnings involves
an annual increase of $30,000 and $36,000 respectively,
the importance of increasing obligated service time for
Navy-sponsored residency programs may appear especially
attractive. This lengthening of obligated service, together
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with an increase in the number of Navy-sponsored residency
billets in these desired specialties, unfortunately, will
not begin to alter the structure o-f the force -for at least
five and usually six years from enactment when these addi-
tional years of obligated service begin to be served by
surgeons and hospi tal -based physicians.
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APPENDIX A
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY LENGTH-OF-SERVICE
COUNT
ROW PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER ROW
COL PCT TOTAL
TOT PCT [ 1 .1 2. [ 3. [ 4. t 5. I 6 .1 7. [ 8. t 9 .1
0. [ I 219 [ 5 [ 2 [ [ 1 I 1 1 1 2 I 230
[ 0.0 I 95.2 t 2.2 t 0.9 [ 0.0 [ 0.4 I 0.0 I 0.4 [ 0.9 I 5.3
[ 0.0 I 14.8 [ 1.2 [ 1.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.4 I 0.0 I 0.2 [ 0.3 I
[ 0.0 I 5.0 [ 0.1 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 I
1. [ I 391 [ 17 [ 14 [ 19 [ 15 I 18 [ 25 [ 19 I 518
0.0 I 75.5 [ 3.3 [ 2.7 [ 3.7 [ 2.9 I 3.5 [ 4.8 [ 3.7 I 11.8
0.0 I 26.4 [ 4.2 [ 6.7 1 4.5 [ 6.3 I 6.0 I 5.0 I 2.9 I
0.0 I 8.9 [ 0.4 [ 0.3 [ 0.4 [ 0.3 I 0.4 I 0.6 t 0.4 I
-I
I2. [ I 222 [ 42 [ 23 [ 30 [ 22 I 32 I 46 [ 36 458
0.0 I 48.5 [ 9.2 [ 6.1 6.6 [ 4.8 I 7.0 I 10.0 [ 7.9 I 10.5
0.0 I 15.0 [ 10.3 [ 13.5 [ 7.1 [ 9.2 I 10.6 [ 9.3 1 5.5 I










I3. I 161 [ 20 I 46 [ 43 418
0.0 I 38.5 [ 7.7 [ 4.8 I 12.0 [ 4.8 I 11.0 I 11.0 I 10.3 I 9.5























I4. 26 [ 64 370
0.5 I 32.2 8.6 4.9 10.8 I 4.3 I 7.0 [ 14.3 [ 17.3 I 8.S


























0.6 I 24.9 13.2 4.5 9.3 [ 8.4 I 7.8 [ 16.2 I 15.0 I 7.4























I6. 1 49 315
00 I 16.5 14.0 4.8 15.6 7.6 I 13.3 [ 12.7 [ 15.6 : 7.2
0.0 I 3.5 10.8 7.2 11.5 10.0 I 13.9 8.1 1 7.6 i






0.5 I 1.0 t 0.9 [ 1.1 i
-i
i7. 1 4 I 57 I IS I 23 38 1 54 278
1.4 I 20.5 1 11.2 1 (.1 1 14.0 5.4 I 8.3 13.7 1 19.
«
i 6.4
2.4 I 3.8 1 7.6 1 8.2 ] 9.2 6.3 I 7.6 7.7 1 8.3 i










i8. 1 2 I 36 ] 7 I 22 1 S3 252
0.8 I 14.3 1 15.1 1 7.1 1 13.5 1 2.8 I 8.7 1 16.7 1 21.0 i 5.8

























i9. 1 38 170
2.4 t 17.6 1 11.2 I 4.7 1 14.1 1 7.1 I 7.1 1 13.5 1 22.4 i 3.9
2.4 I 2.0 ] 4.7 1 3.8 1 S.6 1 5.0 I 4.0 I 4.6 1 5.9 i
0.1 I 0.7 1 0.4 1 0.2 1 0.5 1 0.3 I 0.3 I 0.5 1 0.9 I
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COUNT I
ROH PCT I EXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT I
TOT PCT I I.I 2.1 J.I «.i 5.1 6 .i ;., g , , j
10. I 2 1 28 I 10 I 5 1 14 I 13 I 8 1 27 I 31 I
I 1.4 I 20.3 I 7.2 I 3.6 I 10.1 I 9.4 I 5.8 I 19.6 I 22.5 I
I 1.2 I 1.9 I 2.5 I 2.4 I 3.3 I 5.4 I 2.6 I 5.4 I 4.8 I
I 0.0 I 0.6 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.3 I 0.3 I 0.2 I 0.6 I 0.7 I
11. I 6 1 28 I 8 1 5 1 16 I 13 I 5 1 11 I 19 I
I 5.4 I 25.2 I 7.2 I 4.5 I 14.4 I 11.7 I 4.5 I 9.9 I 17.1 1
I 3.6 I 1.9 I 2.0 I 2.4 I 3.8 I 5.4 I 1.7 I 2.2 I 2.9 I
I 0.1 I 0.6 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.4 I 0.3 I 0.1 I 0.3 I 0.4 I
12. I 8 1 10 I 7 1 11 5 1 7 1 5 1 10 I 19 I
I 11.1 I 13.9 I 9.7 I 1.4 I 6.9 I 9.7 I 6.9 I 13.9 I 26.4 I
I 4.8 I 0.7 I 1.7 I 0.5 I 1.2 I 2.9 I 1.7 I 2.0 I 2.9 I
I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.0 I 0.1 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.2 I 0.4 I
13. I 8 1 9 1 9 1 4 1 12 I 8 1 9 1 12 I 29 I
I 8.0 I 9.0 I 9.0 I 4.0 I 12.0 I 8.0 I 9.0 I 12.0 I 29.0 I
I 4.8 I 0.6 I 2.2 I 1.9 I 2.8 I 3.5 I 5.0 I 2.4 I 4.5 I
I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.5 I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.3 I 0.7 I
14. I 11 I 2 1 10 I 5 1 15 I 10 I 9 1 16 I 24 I
I 10.8 I 2.0 I 9.8 I 4.9 I 14.7 I 9.8 I 8.8 I 15.7 I 23.5 I
I 6.5 I 0.1 I 2.5 1 2.4 I 3.5 I 4.2 I 5.0 I 5.2 I 5.7 I
I 0.3 I 0.0 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.5 I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.4 I 0.5 I
15. I 9 1 7 1 6 1 5 1 5 1 7 1 7 1 8 I 17 I
I 12.7 I 9.9 I 8.5 I 7.0 I 7.0 I 9.9 I 9.9 I 11.5 I 25.9 I
I 5.4 I 0.5 I 1.5 I 2.4 I 1.2 I 2.9 I 2.3 I 1.6 I 2.4 I
I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.4 I
16. I 7 1 9 1 10 I 3 1 8 1 3 1 5 1 8 1 18 I
I 9.9 I 12.7 I 14.1 I 4.2 I 11.3 I 4.2 I 7.0 I 11.3 I 25.4 I
I 4.2 I 0.6 I 2.5 I 1.4 I 1.9 I 1.3 I 1.7 I 1.6 I 2.8 I
I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.2 I 0.4 I
17. I 10 I 3 1 9 1 2 1 9 1 2 1 4 1 8 1 16 I
I 15.9 I 4.8 I 14.3 I 3.2 I 14.3 I 3.2 I 6.3 I 12.7 I 25.4 I
I 6.0 I 0.2 I 2.2 I 1.0 I 2.1 I 0.8 I 1.3 I 1.6 I 2.5 I
I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.2 I 0.0 I 0.2 I 0.0 I 0.1 I 0.2 I 0.4 I
18. I 10 I 4 1 6 1 SI 11 3 1 1 5 1 15 I
I 21.5 I 8.5 I 12.8 I 10.6 I 2.1 I 6.4 I 0.0 I 10.6 I 27.7 I
I 6.0 I 0.3 I 1.5 I 2.4 I 0.2 I 1.3 I 0.0 I 1.0 I 2.0 I
I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.0 I 0.1 I 0.0 I 0.1 I 0.3 I
19. I 10 I 11 7 1 3 1 4 1 6 1 3 1 4 1 17 I
I 18.2 I 1.8 I 12.7 I 5.5 I 7.3 I 10.9 I 5.5 I 7.3 I 30.9 I
I 6.0 I 0.1 I 1.7 I 1.4 I 0.9 I 2.5 I 1.0 I 0.8 I 2.6 I
I 0.2 I 0.0 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.4 I
20. I 14 I 3 1 5 1 3 1 4 1 2 1 1 4 1 6 1
I 34.1 I 7.3 I 12.2 I 7.3 I 9.8 I 4.9 i 0.0 I 9.8 I 14. i I
I 8.3 I 0.2 1 1.2 I 1.4 I 0.9 I 0.8 I 0.0 I 0.8 I 0.9 I

























COLUMN 168 1482 407 208 425 240 302 496 649 4377
TOTAL 3.8 53.9 9.3 4.8 9.7 5.5 6.9 11.3 14.8 100.0
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COUNT
ROW PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGVN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT















[ 7 .1 8. [ 9.1
21. t I 4 1 5 I
[ 33.3 [ 5.6 I 19.4 [ 5.6 I 11.1 [ 0.0 1 0.0 I 11.1 [ 13.9 I
[ 7.1 ! 0.1 I 1.7 1 1.0 [ 0.9 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I 0.8 0.8 I
[ 0.3 t 0.0 I 0.2 [ 0.0 [ 0.1 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I 0.1 [ 0.1 I
22. [ 3 [ 2 I 1 [ 4 [ 2 1 3 I I 2 [ 5 I
[ 13.6 I 9.1 I 4.5 I 18.2 [ 9.1 [ 13.6 [ 0.0 I 9.1 [ 22.7 I
[ 1.8 [ 0.1 I 0.2 I 1.9 [ O.S [ 1.3 [ 0.0 I 0.4 0.8 I
[ 0.1 [ 0.0 I 0.0 [ 0.1 [ 0.0 [ 0.1 [ 0.0 I 0.0 [ 0.1 I
2J. [ 7 [ 1 I [ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ I 2 [ 6 I
[ 36.8 [ 5.3 I 0.0 [ 5.3 [ 5.3 [ 5.3 [ 0.0 I 10.5 [ 31.6 I



















0.0 I 0.1 I
24. I 3 I
38.5 0.0 I 0.0 t 15.4 [ 23.1 0.0 [ 0.0 I 0.0 1 25. 1 I














0.0 [ 0.1 I
25. 1 t I I [ 3 I
50.0 0.0 I 8.3 [ 0.0 [ 8.3 0.0 [ 0.0 I 8.3 25.0 I










[ 0.0 I 0.0 0.1 I
26. ! I 3 t 1 I
46.2 0.0 I 0.0 0.0 15.4 7.7 [ 0.0 I 23.1 7.7 I
3.6 0.0 I 0.0 0.0 O.S 0.4 [ 0.0 I 0.6 0.2 I




27. 7 2 I •z 1 1 1 [ 1 t 4 I
36.8 10.5 I 10.5 5.3 5.3 5.3 0.0 t 5.3 21.1 1
4.2 0.1 I 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 ! 0.0 I 0.2 0.6 I








28. 1 5 ] I 1 I 1 1 I
50.0 1 0.0 I 10.0 1 10.0 ! 10.0 1 0.0 0.0 I 10.0 10.0 I
3.0 1 0.0 I 0.2 1 0.5 1 0.2 1 0.0 0.0 I 0.2 1 0.2 I
0.1 1
3 1
0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 ] 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 I
29. 1 I 2 1 1 1 I 1 2 I
42.9 ] 0.0 I 28.6 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 ] 0.0 I 0.0 28.6 I
1.8 1 0.0 I 0.5 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.3 I























RON PCT IEXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT I
TOT PCT 1 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 .!
30. I 31 01 21 01 01 0! 01 01 11
I 50.0 I 0.0 I 33.3 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 16.7 I
I 1.8 I 0.0 I 0.5 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.2 I
I 0.1 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
31.1 11 01 01 01 11 01 01 11 01
I 33.3 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 33.3 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 33.3 I 0.0 I
I 0.6 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.2 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.2 I 0.0 I
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
32. I 11 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
I 100.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
I 0.6 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
33. I 01 01 01 11 01 01 01 01 01
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 100.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.5 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I O.C I
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
38. I 01 11 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
I 0.0 I 100.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
I 0.0 I 0.1 I 0.0 t 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I
39. I 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 11
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 100.0 I
I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.2 1















COLUMN 168 1482 407 208 425 240 302 496 669 4377
TOTAL 3.8 33.9 9.3 1.8 9.7 5.S 6.9 11.3 14.8 100.0
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS • 70
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APPENDIX B
PHYSICIAN SPECIALTY BY AGE
COUNT
ROW PCT I EXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT
TOT PCT [ 1 .1 2. [ 3. t 4. [ 5 .1 6. I 7. [ 8. I 9.1
24. [ I 2 [ [ I I [ [ [ I
[ 0.0 I 100.0 I 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I
[ 0.0 I 0.1 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I 0.0 [ 0.0 0.0 0.0 I
[ 0.0 I 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I
25. [ I 4 [ [ [ 1 I [ [ [ I
[ 0.0 I 80.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 20.0 I 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 0.0 I
[ 0.0 I 0.3 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.2 I 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I
[ 0.0 I 0.1 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I
26. [ I 86 1 [ 1 [ I 1 1 1 [ [ I
[ 0.0 I 96.6 ! 0.0 [ 1.1 [ 0.0 I 1.1 [ 1.1 [ 0.0 I 0.0 I
[ 0.0 I (.3 [ 0.0 [ 0.5 1 0.0 I 0.4 t 0.3 [ 0.0 1 0.0 I
[ 0.0 I 2.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 [ 0.0 I
27. [ I 162 [ [ 1 t 1 I 4 [ 3 [ 1 [ 3 I
t 0.0 I 92. 6 I 0.0 [ 0.6 1 0.6 I 2.3 [ 1.7 [ 0.6 [ 1.7 1
[ 0.0 I 11.8 [ 0.0 [ 0.5 t 0.2 I 1.7 [ 1.0 [ 0.2 I 0.5 I













[ 0.1 [ 0.0
I 20
[ 0.1 I
28. [ I [ 4 [ 9 I
[ 0.0 I 69.6 I 4.2 [ 2.9 [ 3.8 I 5.0 I 2.5 1 8.3 [ 3.8 I
[ 0.0 I 12.2 [ 2.6 [ 3.4 1 2.2 I 5.1 I 2.0 [ 4.2 [ 1.4 I









29. [ I 179 I 18 I 17 [ 16 I
[ 0.0 I 58.3 [ 6.5 [ 4.9 [ 5.9 I 5.5 t 7.2 [ 6.5 [ 5.2 I












[ 0.4 I 0.4 I 0.5 [ 0.5 ! 0.4 I
30. [ 37 I 15 I 33 I 29 [ 33 I
t 0.0 I 41.0 [ 9.0 [ 4.6 [ 11.4 I 4.6 [ 10.2 [ 9.0 t 10.2 I














SI. I 152 33 I 15 51 I
0.0 I 40.5 1 4.5 1 5.3 8.8 I 4.0 10.7 12.5 13.6 I
0.0 I 11.1 4.4 9.9 8.0 I 6.3 13.5 9.8 7.9 I
0.0 I 3.6 0.4 0.5 0.8 I 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.2 I
32. I 98 1 39 ] 14 45 I 14 ] 29 1 56 47 I
0.0 I 28.7 1 11.4 ] 4.1 13.2 I 4.1 1 8.5 1 16.4 13.7 I













33. 1 1 I 64 1 36 I 18 1 53 I
0.3 I 22(2 1 13.5 1 5.6 1 12.5 I 6.3 1 12.5 1 8.7 18.4 I















34. ] 54 1 33 I 13 1 42 I
o.« I 22 1 12.3 1 7.4 1 13.5 I 5.3 ] 7.0 1 14.8 ] 17.2 I
o.< I J. 9 1 7.7 1 8.9 1 8.0 I 5.5 1 5.7 1 7.5 6.5 I



























RON PCT IEXEC GMO SURO OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR MOSPB OTHER
COL PCT I
TOT PCT I l.I 2.1 5.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9.1
55. I 1 59 I 22 I 12 I 29 I 15 I 20 I 28 I 58 I
I 0.0 I 19.4 I 10.9 I 6.0 I 14.4 I 6.5 I 10.0 I 13.9 I 18.9 I
I 0.0 I 2.8 I 5.7 I 5.9 I 7.0 I 5.5 I 6.7 I 5.8 I 5.9 I
I 0.0 I 0.9 I 0.5 I 0.3 I 0.7 I 0.3 I 0.5 I 0.7 I 0.9 1
56. I 2 1 34 I 14 I 11 I 21 I 8 1 18 I 27 I 33 I
I 1.2 1 20.2 I 8.3 I 6.5 I 12.5 I 4.8 I 10.7 I 16.1 I 19.6 I
I 1-2 I 2-5 I 3.6 I 5.4 I 5.1 I 3.4 I 6.1 I 5.6 I 5.1 I
I 0.0 I 0.8 I 0.3 I 0.3 I 0.5 I 0.2 I 0.4 I 0.6 I 0.8 I
37. I 3 1 18 I 16 I 10 I 18 I 8 1 13 I 22 I 32 I
I 2-1 I 12-9 I 11.4 I 7.1 I 12.9 I 5.7 I 9.5 I 15.7 I 22.9 I
I 1-8 I 1.5 I 4.1 I 4.9 I 4.4 I 5.4 I 4.4 I 4.6 I 5.0 I
I 0.1 I 0.4 I 0.4 I 0.2 I 0.4 I 0.2 I 0.5 I 0.5 I 0.8 I
58. I 11 20 I HI 7 1 18 I 11 I 8 1 18 I 20 I
I 0.9 I 17.5 I 9.4 I 4.1 I 15.8 I 9.6 I 7.0 I 15.8 I 17. 5 I
I 0.4 I 1.5 I 2.8 I 5.4 I 4.4 I 4.6 I 2.7 I 5.8 I 5.1 I
I 0.0 I 0.5 I 0.5 I 0.2 I 0.4 I 0.5 I 0.2 I 0.4 I 0.5 I
59. I 2 1 14 I 20 I 10 1 14 I 9 1 7 1 21 I 26 I
I 1.6 I 12.6 I 15.7 I 7.9 I 12.4 I 7.1 I 5.5 I 16.5 I 20.5 I
I 1.2 I 1.2 I 5.2 I 4.9 I 5.9 I 5.8 I 2.4 I 4.4 I 4.0 I
I 0.0 I 0.4 I 0.5 I 0.2 I 0.4 I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.5 I 0.6 I
40. I 5 1 16 I 9 1 4 1 14 I 12 I 8 1 11 I 29 I
I 2.8 I 15.1 I 8.5 I 5.8 I 15.2 I 11.5 I 7.5 I 10.4 I 27.4 I
I 1.8 I 1.2 I 2.5 I 2.0 I 5.4 I 5.1 I 2.7 I 2.5 I 4.5 I
I 0.1 I 0.4 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.3 I 0.5 I 0.2 I 0.5 I 0.7 I
41. I 6 1 14 I 15 I 4 1 9 1 16 I 12 I 20 I 21 I
I 5.1 I 12.0 I 12.8 I 5.4 1 7.7 I 15.7 I 10.5 I 17.1 I 17.9 I
I 5.6 I 1.0 I 5.9 I 2.0 I 2.2 I 6.8 I 4.0 I 4.2 I 5.5 I
I 0.1 I 0.5 I 0.4 I 0.1 I 0.2 I 0.4 I 0.5 I 0.5 I 0.5 1
42. I 11 I 17 I 12 I 6 1 11 I SI SI 11 I 29 I
I 10.5 I 15.9 I 11.2 I 5.4 I 10.3 I 4.7 I 4.7 I 10.3 I 27.1 I
I 4.5 I 1.2 I 5.1 I 5.0 I 2.7 I 2.1 I 1.7 I 2.5 I 4.5 I
I 0.5 I 0.4 I 0.5 I 0.1 I 0.5 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.5 I 0.7 I
45. I 7 1 10 I 11 I 5 1 15 I 7 1 4 1 6 1 15 I
I 9.0 I 12.8 I 14.1 I 5.8 I 16.7 I 9.0 I 7.7 I 7.7 I 19.2 I
I 4.2 I 0.7 I 2.8 I 1.5 I 5.1 I 5.0 I 2.0 I 1.5 I 2.5 I
I 0.2 I 0.2 I 0.5 I. 0.1 I 0.5 I 0.2 I 0.1 I 0.1 I 0.4 I
44. I 9 1 14 I 4 1 2 1 5 1 SI 11 9 1 20 I
I 12.7 I 19.7 I 8.S I 2.8 I 7.0 I 7.0 I 1.4 I 12.7 I 28.2 I
I S.4 I 1.0 I 1.5 I 1.0 I 1.2 I 2.1 I 0.5 I 1.9 I 5.1 I

























ROW PCT I EXEC GMO SURG OBGVN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER
COL PCT
TOT PCT I 1 .1 2. I 3. I 4. I 5. ( 6. I 7. I 8. I 9 . I
45. I 16 I 8 I 8 I 5 1 8 I 10 [ 1 I 13 I 15 I
I 19.0 I 9.5 I 9.5 I 6.0 I 9.5 I 11.9 1 1.2 I 15.5 I 17.9 1
I 9.5 I 0.6 I 2.1 t 2.5 I 1.9 t 4.2 I 0.3 [ 2.7 t 2.3 I
I 0.4 I 0.2 [ 0.2 [ 0.1 I 0.2 I 0.2 t 0.0 I 0.3 [ 0.4 I
46. 1 10 I 13 [ 7 t 4 I 6 1 6 [ t 4 I 17 I
I 14.9 I 19.4 I 10.4 I 6.0 I 9.0 [ 9.0 [ 0.0 I 6.0 I 25.4 I
[ 6.0 I 0.9 [ 1.8 [ 2.0 1 1.5 1 2.5 I 0.0 I 0.8 1 2.6 I
I 0.2 I 0.3 1 0.2 [ 0.1 [ 0.1 [ 0.1 [ 0.0 I 0.1 I 0.4 I
47. 1 5 I 5 [ 7 t 4 I 2 [ 5 [ 1 I 12 I 14 I
9.1 I 9.1 12.7 I 7.3 [ 3.6 1 9.1 [ 1.8 I 21.8 [ 25.5 I
[ J.O I 0.4 1.8 I 2.0 I 0.5 t 2.1 I 0.3 [ 2.5 1 2.2 I










[ 0.3 1 0.3 I
48. [ 8 I 5 [ 2 [ 11 I
18.6 I 11.6 16.3 I 2.3 I 9.3 I 7.0 I 4.7 I 4.7 [ 25.6 1
4.8 I 0.4 1.8 0.5 I 1.0 [ 1.3 I 0.7 [ 0.4 I 1.7 I
















I49. 12 I 4
22.
6
t 7.5 9.4 7.5 t 11.3 [ 5.7 3.8 I 15.1 [ 17.0 I






















50. I 13 I
50. I 10.0 (.0 4.0 8.0 [ 2.0 [ 0.0 I 14.0 [ 26.0 I




















51. 1 14 I
21.2 I !<:.l 3.0 0.0 6.1 6.1 3.0 6.1 [ 42.4 I




















52. 1 4 ] 2 I
21. 9 I 18.8 1 12.5 1 3.1 1 12.5 1 3.1 1 3.1 1 18.8 1 4.3 I
4.2 I 0.4 1 1.0 1 0.5 1 1.0 1 0.4 1 0.3 1 1.3 0.3 I
0.2 I 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.0 I
53. 1 6 I 4 1 5 1 1 1 1 ] 1 4 1 4 I
25.0 I 16.7 1 20.8 1 0.0 1 4.2 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 16.7 1 16.7 I



















54. 1 10 8 I
30.3 I 9.1 1 12.1 1 3.0 ] (.1 1 3.0 1 3.0 1 9.1 1 24.2 I
«.o I 0.2 1 1.0 1 O.S 1 0.5 1 0.4 1 0.3 1 0.4 1 1.2 I

























ROM PCT I EXEC GMO SURG OBGYN INTMED PEDS FAMPR HOSPB OTHER ROM
COL PCT TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1 . J.I 3. I 4.1 5. I 6. I 7. I 8. I 9.
55. [ 4 [ I 3 [ 2 I 1 [ 1 [ 1 8 19
[ 21.1 I 0.0 I 15.8 I 10.5 I 0.0 [ 0.0 5.3 [ 5.3 42.1 0.5
t 2.4 I 0.0 I 0.8 I 1.0 I 0.0 [ 0.0 0.3 0.2 1.2






56. [ 5 [ 3 I 2 [ 1 I IS
33.3 20.0 I 13.3 6.7 I 0.0 6.7 0.0 13.3 6.7 0.4
3.0 0.2 I 0.5 [ 0.5 I 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.2
0.1 0.1 I 0.0 0.0 I 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
57. 5 1 I 5 [ I 2 2 2 17
29.4 5.9 I 29.4 0.0 I 11.8 0.0 0.0 11.8 11.8 0.4
3.0 0.1 I 1.3 0.0 I 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3
0.1 0.0 I 0.1 0.0 I 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0
59. I 5 1 1 I 3 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 ] 16
31.3 1 6.3 Z 18.8 ] 6.3 t 6.3 ] 0.0 1 6.3 1 18.8 1 6.3 1 0.4








0.1 1 0.0 I
-
1-







1 1to. I 2 1 t 1 1 6
0.0 1 16.7 I SJ. 5 1 0.0 I 16.7 1 0.0 1 16.7 1 0.0 1 16.7 ] 0.1
0.0 I 0.1 I 0.5 1 0.0 I 0.2 1 0.0 1 0.3 1 0.0 1 0.2 1
0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 1
1
0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1
61. I 1 I I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 4 1 8
12.5 I 0.0 I 12. S ] 12.5 I 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 1 12.5 1 50.0 1 0.2





0.0 1 0.0 I
-
1-







1 162. I I 1 I 1 I 4
25.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 25.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 1 25.0 1 25.0 1 0.1












I64. I I I t I 1
0.0 I 100.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0
0.0 I 0.1 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 1 0.0 I 0.0 1
0.0 I
I












165. I t I 2
0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 50.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 50.0 I 0.0 I 0.0
0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.2 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.2 I 0.0 I
0.0 I
I












I67. I 1 I I 1
0.0 I 100.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0 I 0.0





















TOTAL 4.0 32.6 9.2 4.8 9.8 5.6 7.1 11.4 15.3 100.0
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS 250
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APPENDIX C
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR CONSTRUCTED VARIABLES
MEAN STD DEV



















































1.01407723 17397.0000000 3.00000000 9.00000000
5.99151860 29869.0000000 39.00000000




CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS / PROB > IRI UNDER H0:RHO«0 / NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS











0.21189 -0.27626 -0.26015 0.05650
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
4447 4447 4447 4447
0.14065 -0.06298 -0.04389 -0.06449
0.0001 0.0001 0.0034 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447
0.16155 0. 17343 -0.51265 0.08356 0. 11837
o.oooi 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447
0.04733 -0.05377 -0.07044 -0.08206 0.07812
0.0016 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001












1.00000 -0.22561 -0.15724 -0.23105 -0.16955
0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447
•0.19262 -0.25237 -0.29396 -0.13872 -0.22596 0.22307
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001




















•0.22561 1.00000 -0.07040 -0.10345 -0.07591 -0.08625 -0.11299 -0.13162 0.05416 0.03896 -0.05971
o.oooi 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0094 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447
0.15724 -0.07040 1.00000 -0.07210 -0.05291 -0.06011
-0.0787S -0.09173 -0.02625 0.01S68 0.01900
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0801 0.2957 0.2O53
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447
0.23105 -0.10345 -0.07210 1.00000 -0.07774 -0.08832 -0.11572 -0.13479 0.00921 0.02164 -0.00048
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.5391 0.1490 0.9742
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 444 7
0.16955 -0.07591 -0.05291 -0.07774 1.00000 -0.06481 -0.08491 -0.09891 0.029J9 0.05940 -0.06069
0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0500 0.0001 0.0001









0.08832 -0.06481 1.00000 -0.09647 -0.11238 -0.05604 -0.01900 0. 07010
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.2053 0.0001





-0.51265 -0.07044 -0.25237 -0.11299 -0.07875 -0.11572
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001




0.08356 -0.08206 -0.29396 -0.13162 -0.09173 -0.13479 -0.09891 -0.11238
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447
1.00000 -0.1472J 0.03134 0.00341 -0.01188
0.0000 0.0001 0.0366 0.8203 0.4285
4447 4447 4447 4447 4647
0.14723 1.00000 0.07564 0.08741 -0.11697
0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 6447
VOL 0.11837 0.07812 -0.13872 0.05416 -0.02625 0.00921 0.02939 -0.05604 0.03134 0.07564 1.00000
VOL 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0801 0.5391 0.0500 0.0002 0.0366 0.0001 0.0000
4447 4447 4447 4447 444 7 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 444 7
PRIOR 0.29760 0.23067 -0.22596 0.03896 0.01568 0.02164 0.05940 -0.01900 0.00341 0.08741 -0.21806
PRIOR 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0094 0.2957 0.1490 0.0001 0.2053 0.8203 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447
AFHPSP -0.35739 -0.22214 0.22307 -0.05971 0.01900 -0.00048 -0.06069 0.07010 -0.01188; -0.11697 -0.64788
AFHPSP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2053 0.9742 0.0001 0.0001 0.4285 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 444 7 4447 4447 444 7 4447 4447 4447 4447
REGULAR 0.41375 0.24092 -0.24623 -0.02729 -0.03295 0.01651 0.09269 0.00535 -0.00752 0.16541 0.10285
REGULAR 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0688 0.0280 0.2768 0.0001 0.7213 0.4160 0.0001 0.0001














CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS / PROB > IRI UNDER HOiRHO'O / NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS











0.15514 -0.05249 -0.06822 -0.07902 -0.08523 -0.06890 -0.03328 0.04456 0.09337 0.06169 -0.1153*
0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0265 0.0030 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 444 7 4447 4447
0.04431 -0.04118 -0.03688 -0.02837 -0.04614 -0.01875 -0.02361 0.04236 0.01799 0.08606 -0.07602
0.0031 0.0060 0.0139 0.0585 0.0021 0.2112 0.1154 0.0047 0.2303 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447
BOCERT 0.23976 0.19416-0.44726 0.06127-0.02014 0.19067 0.10123 0.06543 0.06562 0.12698 0.21254 0.34435-0.37860
BDCERT 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.1793 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447
FMGRAD 0.06746 -0.00281 -0.05848 -0.02787 -0.00042 0.00999 0.04871 -0.03738 0.05450 0.01836
FMGRAD 0.0001 0.8516 0.0001 0.0631 0.9775 0.5052 0.0012 0.0127 0.0003 0.2209




































GRADE 0.42167 0.39962 -0.45772 0.09387 0.01457 0.07892 0.06644 -0.03749 0.04146 0.18142 0.34577
GRADE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.3315 0.0001 0.0001 0.0124 0.0057 0.0001 0.0001










































































NOTCH 0.04732 -0.03442 -0.06577 -0.01308 -0.01000 -0.00001 0.06315 -0.03369 0.05369 0.03733
NOTCIT 0.0016 0.0217 0.0001 0.3833 0.5048 0.9996 0.0001 0.0247 0.0003 0.0128




LEAVE 0.09315 0.00907 -0.04078 -0.01760 0.03730 0.01430 -0.00810 0.02625
LEAVE 0.0001 0.5452 0.0065 0.0122 0.0129 0.3405 0.5892 0.0800

































-0.01496 0.01322 -0.03789 0.03643
0.3187 0.3780 0.0115 0.0151






0.24216 -0.07182 -0.00296 -0.02998
0.0001 0.0001 0.8438 0.0456




-0.11608 -0.05914 -0.21136 0.24184
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001

















-0.01913 -0.05779 -0.00040 -0.03177 -0.04553
0.2022 O.O0O1 0.9678 0.0341 0.0024


























REGULAR OSTEO NOCAUC SINGLE FEMALE FLIGHT BDCERT FMGRAD GRADE
LINCR 0.41375 0.01942-0.17039-0.15760-0.08818 0.16285 0.11102 0.23976 0.06746
LINCR 0.0001 0.1951 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001












































0.24216 0.15084 0.02506 0.15514 0.04431 -0.44726 -0.05848 -0.13120
0.0001 0.0001 0.0947 0.0001 0.0031 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001




































OBGYN -0.03295 0.00469 -0.00296 -0.05779 0.05109 -0.06822
CBGYN 0.0280 0.7545 0.3438 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447
•0.03688 -0.02014 -0.00042 0.03039 0.01457 0.03407 0.01011
0.0139 0.1793 0.9775 0.0431 0.3315 0.0234 0.5101






0.02998 -0.00060 -0.00009 -0.07902 -0.02837 0.19067 0.00999 0.00108 0.07892
0.0456 0.9678 0.9954 0.0001 0.058S 0.0001 0.5052 0.9429 0.0001












































0.04906 -0.04553 -0.00760 -0.06890 -0.01875 0.06543 -0.03738 -0.05805 -0.03749 -0.02058 -0.05100
0.0011 0.0024 0.4126 0.0001 0.2112 0.0001 0.0127 0.0001 0.0124 0.1708 0.0009





















0.02232 0.01001 0.00883 -0.03328 -0.02361 0.06562 0.05450 -0.02037 0.04146
0.1368 0.5048 0.5540 0.0265 0.1154 0.0001 0.0003 0.1752 0.0057
4447 444 7 4447 4447 4447 4447 444 7 4429 4445
0.11608 -0.04916 -0.04238 0.04456 0.04236 0.12698 0.01836 0.02311 0.18142
0.0001 0.0010 0.0047 0.0030 0.0047 0.0001 0.2209 0.1241 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4429 4445
0.05914 -0.17457 0.02441 0.09337 0.01799 0.21254 0.45770 -0.00042 0.34577
0.0001 0.0001 0. 1036 0.0001 0.2303 0.0001 0.0001 0.9777 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4429 4445
0.21136 -0.14229 -0.12494 0.06169 0.08606 0.34435 -0.09076 0.36816 0.50165
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001

















0.52936 0.03643 0.24184 0.23940
0.0001 0.0151 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447
1.00000 -0.04S20 -0.26749 -0.17714
0.0000 0.0026 0.0001 0.0001
4447 444 7 4447 4447
0.04299 -0.11536 -0.07602 -0.37860 -0.30565
0.0041 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447
0.000)
444 7
-0.25223 -0.60395 -0.57339 -0.65182
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4429 4445 4429 4248
0.09958 0.10915 0.35199 0.11585 0.28861 0.57371 0.65465 0.45211
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0031
4447 4«.47 6447 4447 4429 4445 4429 4248
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CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS / PROB > IRI UNDER HOtRMO'O / NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
REGULAR OSTEO NOCAUC SINGLE FEMALE FLIGHT UNDER BDCERT FMGRAD ELRET GRADE
AGE 0.45211 0.01421 -0.19119 -0.34701 -0.11196 0.09488 0.06216 0.46897 0.30378 0.44402 0.83502
AGE 0.0001 0.3544 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4248 4248 4248 4248 4248 4248 4248 4248 4248 4246 4247
NOTCIT 0.07453 -0.04528 0.12974 -0.09392 0.04940
-0.0S155 -0.03928 0.05477 0.69151 -0.03472 0.14769
NOTCIT 0.0001 0.0025 0.0001 0.0001 0.0010 0.0006 0.0088 0.0003 0.0001 0.0208 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4429 4445
LEAVE -0.07784 0.05441 -0.08832 -0.05144 -0.00989 -0.02321 -0.00163 0.10163 0.02663 0.11754 0.09575
LEAVE 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0006 0.5098 0.1218 0.9136 0.0001 0.0 758 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4429 4445
OSTEO -0.04520 1.00000 -0.01979 -0.02790 -0.02854 0.03599 -0.00079 -0.04433 -0.06009 -0.04844 -0.02185
OSTEO 0.0026 0.0000 0.1871 0.0629 0.0570 0.0164 0.9578 0.0031 0.0001 0.0013 0.1453
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4429 4445
NOCAUC -0.26749 -0.01979 1.00000 0.03773 0.02604 -0.09376 -0.08442 -0.22655 0.09183 -0.10835 -0.28649
NOCAUC 0.0001 0.1871 0.0000 0.0119 0.0825 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4429 4445
SINGLE -0.1771* -0.02790 0.03773 1.00000 0.17695 0.04239 -0.01336 -0.20558 -0.11300 -0.13078 -0.29175
SINGLE 0.0001 0.0629 0.0119 0.0000 0.0001 0.0047 0.3731 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 444 7 4447 4447 4447 4429 4445
FEMALE -0.0(682 -0.02854 0.02604 0.17695 1.00000 -0.04769 -0.05065 -0.07837 0.04456 -0.07578 -0.11657
FEMALE 0.0001 0.0570 0.08r. 0.0001 0.0000 0.0015 0.0007 0.0001 0.0030 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 '447 4447 444 7 4447 4447 4447 4447 4429 4445
FLIGHT 0.09958 0.03599 -O.LS7i 0.042J9 -0.04769 1.00000 -0.08645 -0.03345 -0.01708 0.07461 0.10458
FLIGHT 0.0001 0.0164 0.0001 0.0047 0.0015 0.0000 0.0001 0.0257 0.2549 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 444 7 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4429 4445
UNDER 0.10915 -0.00079 -0.08442 -0.01336 -0.05065 -0.08645 1.00000 0.00634 -0.04177 0.10023 0.10069
UNMED 0.0001 0.9578 0.0001 0.3731 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 0.6725 0.00S3 0.0001 0.0001
4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4447 4429 4445
BDCEOT 0.55199 -0.04433 -0.22655 -0.20558 -0.07837 -0.03345 0.00634 1.00000 0.05260 0.19724 0.59526
BDCERT 0.0001 0.0031 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0257 0.6725 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001































FMGRAD 0.11585 -0.06009 0.09183 -0.11300 0.04456 -0.01708 -0.04177 0.05260 1.00000 -0.02409 0.18185
fmgrad 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0030 0.2549 0.0053 0.0004 0.0000 0.1089 0.0001










0.28861 -0.04844 -0.10835 -0.13078 -0.07578
0.0001 0.0013 0.0001 0.0001
4429 4429 4429 4429
0.57371 -0.02185 -0.28649 -0.29175
0.0001 0.1453 0.0001 0.0001







0.07461 0.10023 0.19724 -0.02409 1.00000 0.44132
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.1089 0.0000 0.0001
4429 4429 4429 4429 4429 4429 4428
0.11657 0.10458 0.10069 0.59526 0.18185 0.44132 1.00000
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
4445 4445 4445 4445 4445 4428 4445
0.14012 0.13848 0.10940 0.48762 0.05617 0.61558 0.82662
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
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